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Abstract 
Okinawa, Japan has a long history of struggle with Japan and the United States of 
America. Okinawa was annexed by the Japanese during the Shogunate, mistreated by Imperial 
Japan during World War II, destroyed during the Battle of Okinawa, and occupied by U.S. 
military. Okinawa hosts some of the largest U.S. military bases outside of the Continental United 
States. Since Okinawa has been occupied by the U.S. military since World War II, it also has a 
history of contentious politics and protests against the occupation. Okinawa’s economy and 
cultural identity within the domestic and international spheres with the U.S. military and the 
Government of Japan has shaped its political protest identities. The “Okinawan Struggle” has 
evolved and into a new form, but often seen as a long lasting and unified struggle. This thesis 
explores Okinawa’s different protest episodes during different governing administrations and 
different economic structures.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
“Even the weeds are burnt. By the end of June, there will be no more food. This is how 
the Okinawan people have fought the war. And for this reason I ask that you give the Okinawan 
people special consideration this day.”  
     -Admiral Minoru Ota, Imperial Japanese Navy 1945 
Admiral Ota wrote this telegram to the Imperial Japanese Army  32
nd
 army before 
committing seppuku (Kerr 1967). In the telegram, Ota described how Okinawans suffered 
throughout the war. He complained how the Japanese army was negligent and that the assault by 
Allied Powers had ruined Okinawa and left its people in destitution. Okinawa lost a third of its 
population during the Battle of Okinawa. Instead of honoring Ota’s request, the mainland 
government first abandoned Okinawa during the battle and as well as a second time to the U.S. 
military in 1952 (Kerr 1967). Okinawa’s subsequent return to Japan in 1972 was expected to be 
viewed as a strong reunion like that of a father and son. However, the Japanese fatherland treated 
Okinawa more like a distant cousin than a close son (Kerr 1967).  
Okinawa was a colony under the Japanese feudal Shimazu clan of Satsuma. After it was 
annexed by Japan in the late 19
th
 century, Okinawa was treated more like a colony than a 
prefecture like others on the mainland and thus more expendable to the Japanese (Kerr 1967). 
Japan then handed Okinawa and its people over to the U.S. military under the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty. Okinawa’s return to Japan in 1972 from the U.S. military regime proved to be no 
different. Japanese again treated Okinawa like a virtual colony and Okinawa became Japan’s 
poorest prefecture, holding the highest rate of unemployment in Japan. The U.S. military, 
meanwhile, maintained a significant military presence on the island.  
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During the U.S. occupation of Okinawa, Okinawa relied heavily on the “base economy” 
(Tanji 2007). When Okinawa returned to Japan, its economy shifted its dependence from the 
U.S. bases to government subsidies from Tokyo, and a service industry focused on Japanese 
tourism (Hiroshi 2011). Okinawa’s service economy emerged during the U.S. occupation and 
catered primarily to Americans (Hiroshi 2011). After 1972, Okinawa’s service economy 
refocused on Japanese tourists. Mainland Japanese businesses bought the best beaches and built 
resorts for mainland Japanese patrons. The Mainland businesses benefited from Okinawa’s resort 
tourism. However, local businesses have only benefited from off-resort souvenir shopping by 
resort tourists. Before and after 1972, Japanese tourism strategists pushed Okinawa to become 
exotic (Figal 2008). The strategists urged Okinawans to develop their unique 
“Ryukyuan/Okinawan” heritage and improve Okinawa’s subtropical environment to attract more 
Japanese tourist (Gerald Figal 2008).
1Japan pushed to reinvent Okinawa’s image as the “Hawaii 
of Japan.” But Japanese tourists regarded Okinawa’s war experience as a part of the Okinawan 
heritage. The Okinawan war tourism attracted Japanese tourists. Okinawan pacifists, in the 
meantime, used the images of war to protest against the U.S. occupation and war.  
Shifts in the service sector (especially tourism) between the 1950s and 1960s affected the 
political and social movement structures. The service sector ultimately drove a political wedge 
between the Okinawan protest communities. As a result, Okinawan protest communities 
questioned Okinawa’s dependence on “imperial money” provided by the Japanese and U.S. 
governments. Okinawa’s economic and political structure was dependent on foreign 
governments. Okinawa’s economy depended on the U.S. government for a government budget, 
                                                 
1
 Nago District, Okinawa, hosts the US Marine Corps military base Camp Schwab. As Matthew Allen (2002) 
explains, Nago has a history of military related crimes and mixed protest. 
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public works, aid, and industry during the U.S. occupation. The U.S. military administration 
dictated Okinawa’s legislation as the highest authority in Okinawa’s government. The U.S. 
military used Okinawa’s dependence on the U.S. bases as leverage to control certain parts of 
Okinawa’s social structure. Okinawa was less economically dependent on the U.S. military after 
its reversion to Japan. Instead, Okinawa depended on aid from the government in Tokyo and 
mainland Japanese tourists. Okinawa’s protest communities potentially threatened Okinawans 
that relied on government aid or Okinawa’s single most important industry. Okinawan protest 
communities avoided confrontational rhetoric that economically threatened Okinawan 
livelihoods.  
The “Okinawa Struggle” is not a linear social movement (Tanji 2007). Although the U.S. 
military was identified as a primary opponent by Okinawan social movements, the social protests 
took different forms within an episode of contention. Each one of these episodes demonstrated a 
stage in evolution of the “Okinawan Struggle.” Okinawa’s political structure under U.S. military 
rule hanged constantly. Furthermore, there was little continuity in U.S. military administration 
policies. There were distinct structural changes and identity shifts through each episode of 
Okinawan protest. Okinawan protest identities shifted to parallel the political and economic 
structure at any given time. The protest communities’ identities did not shift instantaneously with 
structural changes. Instead, available protests identities took advantage of opportunities within 
structures. The U. S. government provided political opportunities for protests communities by 
allowing civilian participation in the government. Economic incentives were important for 
protest repertoires, but the protests became more abstract. The “Okinawa struggle” connected 
different protest communities by symbolizing as a single protest community throughout 
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Okinawa’s political history. The “Okinawa Struggle” is an illusion of a long standing social 
movement. 
Each episode contributed to a distinct era of Okinawan protest identity. The Japanese and 
U.S. national governments did not dictate Okinawa’s political and economic structures. 
Numerous local governments and organizations, such as landowner and the Okinawa Teachers 
Association (OTA) also played major roles in the formation of the Okinawan protest 
communities. To understand the formation of the Okinawan protest identity, it is important to 
analyze these organizations and their engagement with other economic and political 
organizations. The purpose of this thesis is to understand the progression of the Okinawan 
sentiment towards the U.S. military bases. The anti-base sentiment in Okinawa is presented as a 
consistent and linear protest movement within the world order. I will study Okinawa’s cultural 
and protest history to see: Okinawa’s protest ability within the U.S.-Japan Alliance; the 
differences between each major cycles of contention; if the “Okinawan Struggle” is not linear, 
how has evolved as a local struggle into an international struggle. This research will help 
understand where the anti-base sentiment comes from and who typically participates in anti-base 
politics.  
Protest communities used their society’s political structure as a criterion for mobilizing 
supporters and creating repertoires. In the 20
th
 century, Okinawa went through a series of 
economic, political, and social changes. The Okinawans, Japanese, and U.S. officials’ 
perceptions of Okinawans changed with the structural changes. Okinawan protest communities 
created their identities based on the political-economic and social environment. Okinawa’s 
economy relied largely on a one industry and one foreign government/consumer. In the 1950s, 
Okinawa relied on the economic and political aid the U.S. government and military. In the 1960s 
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and 1970s, Okinawa’s service industry’s consumer base was U.S. military personnel. In the 
1990s, Okinawa relied on the government in Tokyo’s economic aid and a tourist industry 
dependent of Japanese consumers. Theories of social movements regarding cultural framing, 
ideology dynamics of contention, political processes, and tourism framed Okinawa’s political 
and economic development in post-war Okinawa. Social movement theories explained the ebb 
and flow of social movements and changed protest community identities within certain political 
environments (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001).  Tourism theory explained the effects of 
tourism/service on an economy that relied on one industry and one consumer market (Enloe 
1989).  
Social movements rise and fall in cycles of protest and are always changing. They are 
greatly influenced by domestic and international trends. An analysis of social movements as 
contentious politics allows us to see how Okinawa was influenced by domestic and international 
politics over time. Contentious politics are episodic, collective political struggles between at least 
two claimants – a challenger and authorities (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Changes within 
the political structure provide political opportunities that may encourage claimants to take action 
against the legitimacy of another claimant (McAdam 1999). Episodes represent an increased 
frequency of contentious politics between claimants that began with changes or threats from the 
political structure (McAdam et al. 2001). This framework of analysis focused on the incentives 
that political structures provide to social movements.    
 Political conflicts (contention) are important to political opportunities for collective 
action. Contention can reveal the weakness of authorities and opportunities for potential allies to 
act against authorities (Tarrow 1998). Political opportunities are not contentious unless 
challengers use them, and contention increases as more people join in contentious action. 
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Challengers encourage would-be challengers to mount challenges of their own, which increases 
the potential for action. Changes in government policies expose weaknesses in the polity and 
create opportunities for contentious actors (Tarrow 1998). The political and environmental 
context is important for a movement organization’s activity – whether they are interest groups, 
grassroots groups, of political parties (Dieter Rucht 1996). Challengers in a repressive regime are 
less likely to establish political parties because they are easily targeted for repression. But when a 
state’s capacity to repress challengers becomes limited as a result of reform (public elections), 
previously repressed challengers may view this as a new opportunity that they can exploit. This 
may create an atmosphere that encourages other groups to act.  
Of course, challengers must work within the political-cultural climate that they live in, 
whether that is a restrictive military regime or an open democratic government (Gamson and 
Meyers 1996). In contrast with restrictive regimes, challengers expect the regime to repress any 
challenges to its legitimacy. Challengers typically rely on big opportunities, such as public 
elections to mount protests, though the types of protests they adopt will designed to fit within a 
regime’s political and cultural structures (Gamson and Meyer 1996).  
Social movement organizations prescribe a set of cultural rules about what organizational 
models actors may or may not use and what they can expect (Clemens 1996). Changes in the 
political structure will change the repertoires set by social movements (Tilly 2004). “Repertoires 
of collective action” are shaped by the ongoing development of an organization’s models within 
a society and that society’s shifting political conditions (Clemens 1996; Tilly 2004). Social 
movements try to adopt a repertoire that fits the political situation (Zald 1996). That 
organization’s repertoire is only sufficient for mobilizing actors if it is culturally acceptable 
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(Clemens 1996). The external and internal conflicts of social movements provide the base for 
future repertoires (Gamson and Meyer 2006; Zald 1996).  
Nationalist movements often treat women as symbols rather than as active participants 
(Enloe 1989; Hein 1999). Women who participate in movements compete with contemporary 
images of citizenship, race, gender and human rights by expanding the role of women in protest 
communities and society. Prostitution was an issue in entertainment districts, but Okinawan and 
U.S. officials overlooked prostitution because prostitution was a major part of the Okinawa’s 
service economy. Issues regarding prostitution are often subject to be overgeneralized in national 
movements and women take on a different role in the movement. Nationalist movements frame 
prostitution as a small problem that will be resolved when the movement for citizenship and 
national rights are met. Prostitutes in Okinawa were either Okinawan women or women 
trafficked from Southeast Asia through the sex-trade.  Prostitution in Okinawa became an issue 
of citizenship, race, gender, and human rights for women in Okinawa and in international 
communities against prostitution (Hein 1999).  
Tourism, as a part of an imperialist system, is a way to exploit and influence foreign 
territories with imperialist ideologies (Enloe 1989). Imperial nation-states promote tourism as an 
industry that can turn the poverty of poor countries into a tourist attraction (Enloe 1989). 
According to Eloe (1989), tourism replaces industrial sectors and agricultural sectors and creates 
poor country’s dependency of “foreign” money. Tourism simultaneously asserts the cultural 
dominance of tourists over a poor country and legitimizes their power as nation-state (Enloe 
1989) Okinawa’s heritage tourism was promoted heavily by mainland Japanese officials and 
tourism experts. Japanese tourism experts pushed Okinawa to promote what mainland Japanese 
perceived to be exotically “Okinawan,” even if something was not indigenous to Okinawa.   
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Tourism is regarded as a service industry. The literature on Okinawa’s economy in the 
1950s, 60s, and 70s does not pay much attention to the tourist economy. Heritage tourism is a 
particular kind of tourism, which has been actively promoted by local governments and private 
business in same countries (Enloe 1989; Jansen-Verbeke & Lievois 1999; Chhabra et al. 2003). 
In terms of urban revitalization, “touristification” requires functions and infrastructures that are 
new to urban communities (Jansen-Verbeke & Lievois 1999). Tourism is a long-term 
commitment at all level of the community and political structures. A successful tourism market 
needs political support, social and economic (financial) sponsorship, and incentives for 
innovation (Jansen-Verbeke & Lievois 1999). Tourism’s capacity to revitalize and develop new 
products requires cultural and heritage resources (castles, museums, crafts, performances, food) 
(Jansen-Verbeke & Lievois 1999). Chhabra et al. (2003) explains that heritage tourists seek 
direct experiences with past and present cultural landscapes, crafts, foods, and performances.   
    Chapter Two discusses Okinawa’s history from when it was an independent kingdom 
in the 14th century to its experiences during World War Two, and the years leading up to the 
United States-Japan Peace treaty in 1952. Okinawa’s feudal history as an exotic sovereign 
kingdom became important to Okinawa’s heritage tourism economy after the war. It 
demonstrated that Okinawa was different from the Japanese feudal culture, and had a special 
cultural and political relationship with feudal East Asia. This chapter discusses Okinawa’s 
annexation by Japan in the late 19th century, during the Meiji Restoration, the colonial 
relationship Japan established with Okinawa, and Okinawa’s experience as a Japanese 
prefecture. Okinawa’s colonial treatment by the Japanese was made clear by Okinawa’s slow 
assimilation process: politically, economically, and culturally. The government in Tokyo was 
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slow to implement mainland policies in Okinawa, because they believed that Okinawa was too 
incompetent to follow their directive.  
Okinawa’s treatment as a Japanese colony became clear during and after World War 
Two. First, the Imperial Japanese Army used violence to suppress the Okinawan language. 
Second, Tokyo sacrificed Okinawa as a battleground without providing Okinawa with proper 
provisions to fight the Americans. Third, Okinawans endured atrocities at the hands of the 
Japanese and Americans. Okinawa lost a third of its indigenous population, which was more than 
the Japanese and Americans casualties during the Battle of Okinawa. Before the Battle of 
Okinawa ended, the U.S. military took administrative measures to control the civilian population. 
More importantly, U.S. forces built and rebuilt military installations. For the Americans, 
constructing Okinawa as a military base was more important than reconstructing civilian life for 
people in Okinawa. After Japan surrendered, Okinawa went through a period of political and 
economic limbo. The U.S. military treated Okinawa as conquered territory. Conquering Okinawa 
allowed the U.S. military to build bases without conflicting with the Atlantic Charter. During the 
war, the U.S. government and British government agreed not to expand their territory through 
war in the Atlantic Charter. Politicians in Washington believed that rebuilding civilian life and 
complete political administration in Okinawa conflicted with the Atlantic Charter. Slow 
international politics kept Okinawa from rebuilding social, political, and economic structures.  
 Chapter Three begins with the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952. The treaty 
established Okinawa’s legal relationship with the U.S. and major structural changes within the 
U.S. military administration and the civilian government. As a result of the treaty, Japan handed 
Okinawa to the United States. Although U.S. officials provided a civilian government, it was 
under careful scrutiny of the military government. The reformed Government of the Ryukyu 
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Islands (GRI) had legislative, judicial, and executive authority over the civilian population, but 
the GRI greatly influenced by the military authorities. Military officials had the final word over 
GRI legislation and economic investments.  
 The 1950s were a politically contentious period, which pitted landowners against the 
military government. Anti-base sentiments grew among Okinawan political parties regarding the 
legal use of private land and unfair treatment of Okinawans by the U.S. military. The 
landowners’ disputes persuaded the GRI to adopt the Four Principles for Land Protection, which 
provided fair compensation to landowners if their property was appropriated or damaged by the 
U.S. military. The Four Principles provoked a special Congressional subcommittee to investigate 
Okinawa and the landowners’ claims. The subcommittee chairperson, Senator Melvin Price, 
issued a report on Okinawa after a short, three day visit. Report ignited an “Island-Wide” protest 
against Price’s report, which included landowner and non-landowners. The U.S. military and 
landowners agreed to a fiscal settlement. The protest community thought the settlement ignored 
the Four Principles, because it failed to stop the U.S. military’s appropriation of land. The protest 
community moved onto other issues against the U.S. military, expect for a few landowners. 
These landowners denied the United States’ compensation, keeping to the Four Principles. Some 
protesters bought land, as small as 35.5 square feet or one Tsubo, to defy the United States (Tanji 
2006). 
Chapter Three analyzes the growth of Japanese nationalism and the “Reversion” 
movement in the 1960s. In attempt to appease the reversion sentiment among some Okinawans, 
U.S. High Command (HICOM) and Washington officials relinquished more legislative powers 
to the GRI. Nonetheless, Okinawans objected to the moves, because HICOM still had the power 
to veto any legislation proposed by the GRI, allowing HICOM to maintain its authority over 
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Okinawa. In 1967, the reversion sentiment grew when the GRI Department of Education and the 
conservative Democratic Party attempted to pass two legislative bills that introduced mainland 
Japanese educational standards and an obstruction of civil service pay, and protests erupted. The 
bills imposed limits on teachers’ ability to participate in protest activities. The “Twin Bills” 
sparked major political unrest involving teachers, civil servants, and reversionists. Although the 
biggest structural change for civil Okinawa was the GRI’s first public election in 1968 and the 
election of a prominent reversion activist, it was not enough to end tensions between Okinawans 
and the U.S. military government.  
 An absolute pacifist sentiment grew in Okinawa. The images of war in Vietnam reminded 
Okinawans of their experiences of war. Okinawan pacifists felt responsible for the atrocities 
committed against the Vietnamese, because Okinawa hosted the U.S. marines. The Vietnam War 
received the number of U.S. troops moving though bases in Okinawa. Military personnel 
contributed to Okinawa’s base and service economy. Okinawa’s service economy laid down the 
foundation for Okinawa’s tourism economy. But service industry businesses built communities 
near military bases, which contributed to high crime around residential and entertainment 
districts in Okinawa. Okinawa’s pre-reversion tourism economy compared to its post-reversion 
tourism economy was a new concept and underrepresented in pre-reversion protest communities. 
Reversionists wanted Japanese citizenship to increase their quality of life in Okinawa. 
Meanwhile, entertainment business workers were cautious to protest against their main clientele. 
Crimes related to military personnel in entertainment districts went unreported and unrepresented 
in protest communities. But after a traffic incident in 1970, a riot ensued, in which five thousand 
people participated. The riot occurred in the entertainment district of Koza city. Okinawans 
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rioted as a new form of protest against the U.S. military. Although an isolated incident, the riot 
represented an underrepresented community in Okinawa, the service industry.  
 Major structural changes occurred in preparation for an after Okinawa’s reversion to 
Japan. In 1972, political activity against the U.S. military in Okinawa began to decline. There 
was some small-scale defiance, by the “one-tsubo” landowners, but there were no large-scale 
demonstrations. Chapter Four explains the infrastructural and the political changes, which 
includes the assimilation of Okinawan organizations, such as the OTA, into their Japanese 
counterparts. Although Okinawa was returned to Japan, and Okinawans’ regained Japanese 
citizenship, the U.S. military maintained a significant presence on the island. The Okinawans did 
not mobilize against the continued U.S. military presence. The Okinawan organizations that 
spearheaded the reversion movement, such as the OTA and GRI, lost their ability to mobilize 
their Okinawan supporters when they assimilated into the Japanese Teachers Union and the 
Okinawan Prefectural Government. Pre-reversion organizations functioned within larger political 
organizations that did not protest against the Japanese Government or U.S. military.   
 Chapter Four explains Okinawa’s shift from a base-economy to an economy dependent 
on Japanese government subsidies and tourism. By the 1990s, Okinawa’s three major industries 
were government subsidies (public works), tourism, and the U.S. military’s payments to use 
civilian land and on-base jobs for Okinawans. These industries, similar to pre-reversion base and 
service economies, relied on money from government in Washington and Tokyo, and from 
mainland vacations. There are two aspects to Okinawa’s tourism economy. The first aspect is the 
unique cultural and beach resort tourism, which was pushed by mainland business strategists in 
the 1960s. The second is the peace tourism, which includes visiting battle sites and museums 
displaying the horrors of war. Although mainland strategists applauded the battle site tours, they 
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also asked the Okinawa Tourism Association to focus on making Okinawa a more exotic place, a 
“Hawaii of Japan” that catered to Japanese vacationers. Although both were important to 
Okinawan identity, the idea of a “Japanese Hawaii” was reinvented by mainland Japanese and 
the Okinawa Tourism Association. Okinawa’s image was created by mainland Japanese 
perceptions of Okinawa. The idea of “Japan’s Hawaii” contradicted the reversion movement’s 
image as Japanese nationals, by differentiating between Okinawans and mainland Japanese.    
 Chapter Five evaluates the relation between the political, economic, and social structures 
and social movement identities during each set of protests. I explain how the political-economy 
structure, especially Okinawa’s service and tourism industry, played an important role in 
decision-making in Okinawa. The literature on Okinawan social movements has alluded to the 
effects of the political-economy, but has downplayed its significance.  
 Literature 
 Miyume Tanji (2006) explored the concept of the “Okinawa Struggle” as a homogeneous 
and continuous social movement. In fact, the “Okinawan Struggle” is a fragmented and diverse 
group of social movements that deployed different methods of protest (Tanji 2006). Although the 
depiction of the “Okinawan Struggle” as a unified protest movement is a myth, it serves to 
provide a diverse protest community within a common cultural identity (Tanji 2006). The 
“struggle” represents Okinawa’s distinct history and culture from the mainland Japanese, before 
and after World War II. The myth is the collective and shared experience of the Okinawan, 
which protest communities used as a symbol of unification between numerous protest 
organizations (Tanji 2006).  
 Tanji (2006) explains that “island-wide” protests in the 1950s focused on the rights of the 
Okinawan landowners, which was comprised of different groups: landowner associations, the 
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Okinawa Teachers Association, labor unions, and left/socialist political parties. The different 
groups shifted their attention away from the landowner disputes after many landowners accepted 
lease agreements with U.S. authorities, which undermined the ‘island-wide” protest community’s 
initial demand for “Four Principles for Land Protection.” Landowners’ acceptance of lease 
agreements split the pro-base landowners from “anti-war” landowners (Tanji 2006). The protest 
community then focused their attention on anti-militarism and the Japanese nationalist 
movement, also known as the “Reversion” movement. The Okinawan protest community 
broadened its repertoire to include more organizations and Okinawans sympathetic to the 
“Reversion” movement.  
 The 1960s set of protests were made of different organizations with different repertoires. 
But the protest community regarded Japanese citizenship as an end-all solution to Okinawa’s 
problems with the U.S. military. A few groups, such as the Anti-War Student’s Congress, 
opposed the reversion movement (Tanji 2006). The Anti-War Student’s Congress and other 
groups argued that the reversion movement undermined the Okinawan identity by trying to 
assimilate with the Japanese identity. The anti-reversion groups argued for options other than 
assimilating with Japan or disregard Okinawa’s return to Japan entirely. But the reversion 
movement viewed the Japanese nation-state as its protector and disregarded the differences 
between the Japanese identity and their own (Tanji 2006). 
 The term “Okinawa Struggle” was first used by the Okinawan protest community during 
their anti-war protest against a meeting between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sato (Tanji 2006). But authorities in Tokyo and Washington paid little attention to 
protests in Okinawa. Okinawa’s reversion to Japan marked a downturn to in activities by 
Okinawa’s protest community. Many groups banded or merged with their Japanese counterparts. 
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For instance, the Okinawa Teachers Association merged with the Japan Teachers Association. 
The anti-war “One-tsubo” landowners continued to defy the U.S.-Japan alliance by taking legal 
actions whenever the opportunity arose. During this low period of Okinawan protests, some 
people organized women’s and environmental groups. The Okinawa protest community was 
mostly divided and inactive throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1995, the rape of an 
Okinawan school girl reinvented the Okinawan protest community into the “Okinawa Struggle” 
(Tanji 2006).  
 The “Okinawa Struggle” has three distinct “episodes of contention” (Tanji 2006). In 
Power in Movements, Sidney Tarrow (1998) agrees that protest movements ebb and flow 
through cycles of contentious politics whenever opportunities for mobilizing protest arises. 
Cycles of protests rely on the relationships between political structures. Political structures are 
anything from government organizations/regimes to the protest communities. Internal regime 
changes can provide resources for other resource deficient institutions (Tarrow 1998). The 
combination of structural relationships that provide opportunities are numerous and an in depth 
study of an “episode of contention” explores those structural relationships. Tanji’s application of 
Tarrow’s theory of social movements provided a framework to study Okinawa’s three major 
protest episodes as cycles of protest for the same movement. Once the political structure is 
mapped out, Tanji applies Benedict Anderson’s theory that communities, such as the “Okinawa 
Struggle” and Japanese nationalism, are socially constructed through a broad context, without 
face-to-face interaction. The nation-state is imagined because citizens perceive that equality 
transcend throughout the entire nation to each individual, regardless of any inequalities 
(Anderson 1983).  According to Tanji (2006), the “Okinawa Struggle” demonstrated that 
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Okinawa’s protest identity was constructed through the political relationships between 
authorities in Okinawa, Japan, and the United States.  
 Masamichi S. Inoue’s (2007) study of the collective Okinawan anti-base supporters,”We 
Are Okinawan,” and the pro-base supporters, “We Are Okinawan of a Different Kind,” 
demonstrated the importance of economic opportunity, gender relationships, and class 
relationships to Okinawan identity and the political choices that different groups made. It was an 
extension of his article, “We Are Okinawans of a Different Kind,” which explored the social 
issues of citizenship, culture and identity, and local life under the U.S.-Japan alliance (Inoue 
2004). Inoue (2004) argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance caused the fragmentation of a once 
unified people in Okinawa. The structure changed from: Okinawan people under U.S. occupation 
to Japanese citizens in Okinawa under an U.S.-Japan alliance. Okinawans realized their position 
in the U.S.-Japan alliance was unbalanced and reevaluated their identity within the Japanese 
nation, especially residents of Nago District.
2
 Inoue expanded his argument and addressed 
criticisms of this article in his book, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age 
of Globalization (2007). Inoue (2007) argued that the Okinawan anti-base identity was 
historically rooted in pre-war Okinawa. Okinawan opposition to military bases grew out of their 
experience as Japanese Imperial subjects in the pre-war period, their experiences during the 
Battle of Okinawa, and their experiences with U.S. occupation after the war. The U.S. 
occupation treated Okinawans like Imperial Japan did. Okinawans had no citizenship or 
authority over themselves and were underdeveloped compared to mainland Japan. Japanese 
                                                 
2
 Nago District, Okinawa, hosts the US Marine Corps military base Camp Schwab. As Matthew Allen (2002) 
explains, Nago has a history of military related crimes and mixed protest. 
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citizenship meant the protection of Okinawans’ human rights and economic prosperity for the 
protest communities during the 1960s (Inoue 2007).  
 After Okinawa was returned to Japan, there was little political activity from anti-base 
Okinawans, but in 1995, after a 12-year-old school girl in the Henoko District was raped, the 
Okinawan anti-base movements re-emerged. Okinawans were now citizens under the U.S. –
Japan alliance and organized an anti-base movement with a reimaged Okinawan identity: “We 
are Okinawans.” Okinawans shed their identity as an oppressed people and adopted a new self-
confident identity, with diverse backgrounds and protest repertoires (Inoue 2007). “We are 
Okinawans” disregarded the importance of working-class Okinawans, especially in Henoko. 
Since the 1950, Camp Schwab restructured social ties by generating economic opportunities for 
working class residents in Henoko (2007). The Henoko community relied on Camp Schwab for 
its economic development since the 1950s. Even after Okinawa’s reversion, the Henoko 
community relied on the base directly and indirectly, whether it was for jobs, service industries, 
lease agreements, or federal financial aid. The anti-base “We are Okinawans” movement 
threatened the livelihood of many Henoko residents who depended on the base and did not 
provide them with economic alternatives, should the base be removed. This was when, as Inoue 
(2007) argued, the Okinawans split into two groups; anti-base, “We are Okinawans” and pro-
base “We are Okinawans of a Different Kind.”  
 Inoue focused on Okinawa’s economic effects on Henoko’s protest communities. 
Okinawa’s economic and social ties are much deeper than Henoko’s experience, but it is still an 
important part of the experience. Today, the largest contributor to Okinawa’s economy is 
Tokyo’s financial aid; the second is the tourist industry, then the base. Okinawa’s tourist industry 
relies heavily on mainland tourists seeking a subtropical vacation in an exotic culture that is 
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different from Japan’s own. The tourist industry promotes Okinawa’s cultural and geographical 
differences. Part of that culture, as Inoue (2007), Tanji (2006), and Allen (2002) argued is 
Okinawa’s experience during the war and the presence of the U.S. military bases. Okinawa’s 
tourist industry contributed very little to the economy in the 1950s and 1960s. Okinawa’s tourist 
industry first developed during the political contention against the U.S. occupation and focused 
on Okinawa’s war experience (Figal 2008). After Okinawa’s reversion, the tourist industry 
celebrated Okinawa’s history as an independent kingdom. Studying the differences and 
transformation of Okinawa’s tourist economy will help understand Okinawa’s anti-base and pro-
base social movement identities.  
 Matthew Allen (2002) argued that the perception of the Okinawan identity overlooked 
the diverse local cultures in Okinawa. He explained that the two villages on Kumejima (Kume 
Island), which was removed from Okinawa’s protest communities, demonstrated two different 
Okinawan identities. Kumejima was removed from Okinawa’s protest community because it is 
disconnected from Okinawa’s mainland and it never hosted a U.S. military base. Kumejima’s 
residents did not have the same problems as the rest of Okinawa. Kumejima’s political and 
economic structures were left alone by the U.S. military, politics in mainland Okinawa, and 
politics in Tokyo. The two villages on Kumejima differed from mainland Okinawa because they 
were isolated from mainland Okinawa politics and culture. The villages differed from each other 
because their basic day-to-day lives were different such as: food, industry, history, and locality 
(Allen 2002). Allen (2002) explained that Kumejima’s political dialogue about the tourist 
industry showed their differences. Kumejima officials realized they had different visions for the 
tourist industry and different ideas of what it meant to be a Kumejima resident. In order to 
promote the tourist industry, the Kumejima officials attempted to restructure the two villages’ 
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cultural identity so that it was marketable to mainland Okinawan and Japanese tourists (Allen 
2002). During the process, the Kumejima residents evaluated what was most important to their 
identity as a Kumejima resident and what was most marketable to tourists. The tourist market 
perceived the residents on Kumejima as the same. The market pushed Kumejima officials and 
residents to culturally unify to accommodate the tourist market (Allen 2002). Tourism forced the 
different Kumejima villages to identify as a unified culture, which began to identify with the 
protest communities on mainland Okinawa (Allen 2002).  
 Tourism is typically regarded as a service industry. Hiroshi Kakazu (2011) explained that 
tourism is more complex than simply service. In fact: Okinawa, for example, aside from the 
conventional tourism industry such as hotels, travel agents, transportation, souvenirs and travel 
guides, the industry is deeply and extensively related to local cultures, production sectors, 
information and communication technology (ICT), various entertainments and sports, 
transportation, marketing and promotional activities, conventions and preservation of natural and 
cultural assets (Hiroshi Kakazu 2011: 4). Besides government subsidies and base revenues, 
Okinawa relies on a relatively unsustainable tourism industry that threatens Okinawa’s limited 
environmental resources (Kakazu 2011). Kakazu (2001) explained that reconceptualization 
provided a “development framework to diversify and revitalize diminishing local agriculture and 
manufacturing as well as conserving tourism resources including marine and historical and 
cultural assets” (2011: 4).  
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Chapter 2 - The “Okinawan” Experience 
The identity of the people in Okinawa has been shaped by three different, historical 
periods: as the Ryukyu Kingdom, Imperial Japanese subjects, and during World War II and the 
U.S. military occupation. The political and economic context of each experience shaped the 
Okinawan identity. The “Okinawan Struggle” focused on the similarities in experiences by the 
Okinawan people. Okinawans’ shared experiences influenced their cultural identity, which was 
expressed through clothing, food, music, and religion. Cultural identity is the identity of a group 
that is influenced by the culture and heritage they belong to. The political, economic, and cultural 
environment in each period was different enough to suggest that Okinawan protest communities 
were not one continuous entity. 
Ryukyu Kingdom 
 Okinawa’s cultural identity was first shaped by the Ryukyu Kingdom. The archipelago, 
which ran from Formosa to Japan, was first referred to as the Ryukyu Islands by the Ming 
Dynasty in China. It was ruled by Shuri
3
 and in the late 14
th
 century, the island chain entered 
formal trade relations with China under China’s tributary system.4 After years of appeasing the 
Chinese courts, Ryukyu was dubbed the “Land of Propriety,” which came with additional 
tributary benefits. Shuri’s maritime economy reached from Korea to South Asia. During this 
period Okinawa’s calligraphy, architecture, clothing, behavior, and mannerisms were inspired by 
the Chinese. Chinese influences largely affected the Shuri’s Royal Court, but those influences 
                                                 
3
 Shuri refers to Ryukyu’s government, a monarchy. It also refers to Shurijo Castle, home of the monarchy and 
government ceremonies, centered above the port village of Naha (Kerr 1967).  
4
 China’s tributary system required countries to send tributes to China before they were permitted to trade at Peking. 
Faithful tribute countries would be left alone by China. It is noted that large powers like Russia and Britain traded 
often in Peking and only sent one tribute (Mark Mancall 1968). The Ryukyu Kingdom was regarded as one of the 
most loyal tributary countries (Kerr 1967). 
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slowly spread throughout the kingdom. The Ryukyu Kingdom was not always culturally unified 
(Gregory Smit 1999). The islands that made up the Ryukyus were spread far and wide. People on 
some islands were isolated, and people spoke different languages on islands across the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, which meant that an officer of the Shuri court needed a translator to speak with a 
native of Miyako, an island south of Okinawa mainland – Chuzan (Smit 1999). Sometimes, 
Ryukyu’s strong maritime economy introduced goods from different parts of Asia, but Chinese 
trade and influence dominated Ryukyu culture.  
Japan’s interest in Ryukyu grew during the mid-15th century (Kerr 1967). Japan was 
continually in conflict with China and rarely abided to China’s tributary terms, Japan used their 
relationship with Shuri to trade with China. Shuri even mediated between Peking Kyoto during 
an early 16
th
 century dispute. During this period trade expanded across Asia, but thy stayed out 
of Japan, which was fractured into feudal domains but was unified as isolationists. As Europeans 
became more aggressive, with the Spanish conquest of the Philippines and the British aggression 
in China, Japan saw Ryukyu as a weakness because Shuri had no standing army. The loss of 
Shuri’s capital, Naha, would cut Japan’s point of trade with China and Ryukyu could be used as 
a mean to undermine Japan’s isolationist policies.  
In 1609, the Shimazu clan of the Satsuma domain, Japan, invaded and conquered the 
Ryukyu Kingdom. Shuri, which banned weapons a century earlier, was unable to defend the 
country against the well trained and well equipped Satsuma army. After a swift victory, the 
Shimazu clan imprisoned the King of Ryukyu in Satsuma until he agreed to the terms of 
surrender, which required Shuri to pay yearly proportion of the island’s crop to the Satsuma clan. 
In addition to sending yearly payments, Shuri was required to continue paying tributes both to 
Peking in China and Kyoto in Japan. The Satsuma clan’s primary interest in Ryukyu was its 
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trade with China. Japan-Sino relations and the government in Kyoto had no direct means to trade 
with China. The Satsuma clan monopolized Japanese trade with China through Ryukyu. In order 
to hide Japan’s relationship with Ryukyu, Satsuma officials banned Ryukyuans from speaking 
Japanese and restricted their contact with foreigners. Satsuma officials minimized their 
communication with the Ryukyu Kingdom to avoid rebuke by China.
5
 Satsuma officials insisted 
that Ryukyu trade only with China and Ryukyu to rely on agriculture, not maritime trade. 
Because Shuri relied on a barter system, it made trade worth very little through currencies. The 
Ryukyu Islands barely met standards for sustainable agriculture and relied on the maritime 
economy to procure building supplies and additional food items (Kerr 1967). Ryukyu cultivated 
sugar cane and Chinese sweet potatoes, which were considered luxury items in Japan. The loss 
of it maritime economy forced the Ryukyu Kingdom it poverty. The Ryukyu Kingdom became a 
Japanese colony, though it was disguised as an independent nation.  
China discovered Shuri’s relationship with Japan in the 18th century and promptly cut 
trade with Shuri to the bare minimum. Satsuma officials urged Shuri to recover the lost trading 
rights – the loss was more economically damaging to the Satsuma clan then to Shuri. Although 
the relationship between Ryukyu and Japan was discovered by China, Satsuma officials required 
Shuri to maintain their outward appearance well in to the 19
th
 century, which was designed to 
deceive Westerners about their real relationship. Shuri regained some trading rights with China 
after a long tributary obedience, but the trade never fully recovered (Kerr 1967).  
U.S. Navy commodore Matthew Perry made first American contact with the Ryukyu 
Islands before sailing to mainland Japan. During attempts to establish a formal relationship, 
                                                 
5
 The Satsuma clan only sent detailed instructions to the Ryukyuan magistrate and dispatched agents to investigate 
the behavior of Ryukyuan officials and to maintain prohibitions set by the Satsuma clan (Kerr 1967; John King 
Fairbank 1968).  
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Perry realized there was a relationship between Ryukyu and Japan, but not its full extent.
6
 Perry 
proclaimed that the Ryukyu Islands were under “limited authority” of the United States, though 
this had little effect on Perry’s negotiations for open trade relations with Japan. Still, Japan 
became concerned that Okinawa might be a liability as a means to invade Japan (George Kerr 
1967). Perry successfully opened trade relations with Japan before ending his tour in East Asia. 
He negotiated a compact between Ryukyu and the United States, which allowed favorable 
conditions for U.S. ships.
7
 
 Annexation and Assimilation 
 In January 1868, the Meiji Restoration began in Japan. It began a set of dramatic 
political, economic, and social changes in Japan. Independent lords surrendered their authority to 
the new government in Tokyo. In return, the emperor appointed prominent lords as prefectural 
governors like the prince of Satsuma. Tokyo feared that Ryukyu might be used as a place to 
launch invasions of Japan. In 1872, a crew from a Ryukyu tribute ship sailing form China was 
shipwrecked on the coast of Formosa. Its crew was slaughtered by aborigines. Tokyo took this 
opportunity to claim their sovereignty over the Ryukyu in order to secure Japan’s weak southern 
borders. Tokyo’s initiative to “protect” Ryukyuans and to procure Shuri’s trade agreements with 
                                                 
6
 Commodore Perry recognized that the Japanese pied on Ryukyuans. He did not know the status of their 
sovereignty though. Perry’s inquisition of the Ryukyu Kingodom during the negotiations with Japan taught him that 
the Prince of Satsuma had some governance over Shuri, but Japan did not admit nor deny its sovereignty over the 
Ryukyu Islands (Roger Pineau 1968; Wallach 1952).  
7
 11 July 1854. The compact allowed United States’ ships to harbor in any port and trade. Ryukyu was required to 
assist shipwreck American sailors, provide furnishings for anchored ships in Naha to purchase. During the 
compact’s negotiations, Shuri refused to declare they were fully independent, because of their alliance with China – 
both parties avoided mentioning Japanese governance (Wallach 1952). The compact ended the first United States’ 
occupation of Okinawa (Kerr 1967).  
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the United States, Brittan, and France strengthened Japan’s claims over the Ryukyu Islands (Kerr 
1967).  
 Shuri resisted the Meiji government’s claim and publically disobeyed the Tokyo’s new 
domestic and international laws (Kerr 1967). Shuri did not prosecute Ryukyuans for breaking 
Meiji law and had sent a tribute ship to China in defiance of the Tokyo government, which 
angered the Japanese (Kerr 1967). In response, the Meiji rulers dissolved the Ryukyu monarchy 
and exiled the king to Tokyo. In 1879, Ryukyu became Okinawa, a Japanese prefecture with a 
Japanese governing body. The Shuri government was replaced with Japanese politicians, and the 
Japanese established police and army garrisons on the islands. Leaders in Tokyo angered that 
they had the best intentions for Ryukyu in Formosa and Ryukyu’s sovereignty – that Ryukyu 
was their responsibility (Kerr 1967).  
 Under the Meiji government, Okinawa was marked with economic, political, and cultural 
strife. Leaders in Tokyo treated Okinawa as a political and economic colony, similar to their 
colonies in Korea and Taiwan – this was particularly true in the application of Japanese cultural 
assimilation policies (Kerr 1967; Aiko Watanabe 1970; Steve Rabson 1996). Okinawan 
governors were upcoming mainland politicians who served short terms and then returned to the 
mainland. Okinawa became a “political training ground” for Japanese politicians.8 Japanese 
officials were biased, by politically and socially, against Okinawans. A prince of Japan sent a 
Japanese representative from the mainland to investigate complaints that the Japanese mayor and 
police had treated Okinawans unfairly (Kerr 1967). The representative’s arrogant and hostile 
behavior during the investigation sparked riots and protests by Okinawans. Japanese Officials 
                                                 
8
 Kerr (1967) referred Okinawa as a political training ground for upcoming Japanese politicians. Tokyo officials 
cycled through governors often. Okinawa was governed by eight different governors within thirteen years.  
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believed that Okinawans were incapable of handling Japanese political life and were behind 
Japanese standards of education. Even prominent Shuri officials could obtain only positions at 
the lowest political echelon (Kerr 1967). Japanese politicians and law enforcement officials 
viewed Okinawans as “rustic second-class” citizens (Kerr 1967).  
 Early on, Japanese administrators attempted to suppress non-Japanese cultural practices 
such as local tattoos, dance and music, religious ceremonies and leadership and they worked hard 
to organize the Japanese language on the inhabitants (Rabson 1996). Standardizing language 
through the school system was not successful or well received by Okinawans.
9
 Prominent pro-
Chinese Okinawans rejected Japanese assimilation policies and saw no value in learning 
Japanese (Rabson 1996). Pro-Chinese attitudes declined after a series of Japanese victories 
during the first Sino-Japanese War in April 1985 (S.C.M. Paine 2003). Okinawans promoted 
Japan’s assimilation process after Japan defeated China, largely because they thought it would be 
beneficial to assimilate with the victorious and prospering Japan.
10
 In conjunction with Japanese 
teachers, the All-Okinawan Teachers Association taught Japanese more enthusiastically and 
implemented more drastic punishments against students who spoke native Ryukyuan (Okinawan) 
languages (Rabson 1996). The government in Tokyo waited to reform the Okinawa prefectural 
government ten years after mainland Japan implemented similar reform policies. Okinawa’s 
political, social, and economical systems fell behind to mainland Japan (Matthew Allen 2002 & 
                                                 
9
 Asserting language assimilation through the school system was unsuccessful because: 1) Okinawan children were 
from farming families and school was burdensome to family labor; 2) the spread of education in Okinawa was much 
slower than mainland Japan: 3) Okinawan children were often mistreated by mainland teachers and were not 
invested in their lessons (Rabson 1996; Kerr 1967; Watanabe 1970).  
10
 Rabson (1996) argued the effect of Sino-Japanese War decreased pro-Chinese intellectuals and the majority of 
Okinawans promoted a “bottom-up” culture shift because it was more beneficial for Okinawa. Watanabe (1970) and 
Kerr (1967) argued that the Sino-Japanese War allowed Japan to accelerate its assimilation policies in Okinawa, 
because there was less resistance by pro-Chinese intellectuals.  
26 
2003; Watanabe 1970). Okinawans began to immigrate to Japan with the promise of work, but 
“mainlanders” reminded them of their second class citizenry whenever they spoke or acted 
Okinawan; such as eating pork, a staple of the Okinawan diet. On occasion, Okinawans caught 
speaking Okinawan were arrested and convicted for spying (Rabson 1996; Yoko Sellek 2002). 
The Japanese displayed Okinawans with other Japanese colonial “barbarians in the 1903 
anthropological exhibition in Osaka; which prompted an Okinawan editorial complaining that 
the Japanese treated Okinawans not as Japanese but as a colonized people (Rabson 1996; ben 
Takara 2007).  
Japan’s Meiji parliament, the Diet, evolved similar to Britain’s parliament in the early 
20
th
 century. The Diet, which elected the Prime Minister, agreed to expand Japan’s power across 
Asia. Japan warred with Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and China during the second Sino-
Japanese war. Although Japan was at war during the years leading to World War II, Japan kept 
only a small military garrison in Okinawa (Kerr 1967). Much of Japan’s military was spread 
throughout Asia conquering and policing new territories. Japan’s generals were uncertain of 
Okinawa’s loyalty and were reluctant to have Okinawans join the Imperial Japanese Army 
(I.J.A). Some Okinawan soldiers, served as non-combative soldiers outside of Okinawa (Kerr 
1967). By the 1930s, the Diet of Japan’s supreme political power was given to the emperor and 
generals of the I.J.A., who adopted a kind of fascist policies. Japanese officials tightened policies 
to suppress the Okinawan language. Wartime policies charged and executed Okinawans who 
spoke their native tongues as conspirators and spies (Kerr 1967). Okinawans felt like second 
class citizens because they had little political influence with the central government and 
experienced prejudice by mainlanders, such as being required to sell their natural resources to 
soldiers from the mainland (Kerr 1967; Watanabe 1970).  
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World War II: The Okinawan Experience 
 After Japan declared war against the United States and attacked Pearl Harbor, fighting 
intensified across Asia. Japan fought the Chinese, British and Soviets in Indochina and Burma, in 
china and Manchuria (Korea) and the fought the Americans and Australians on islands in the 
Pacific. Okinawa did little to contribute to the war effort, but the Japanese regarded it as a last 
defense: “The Ryukyus were not Kyushu, or Shikoku, or Honshu; Okinawa retained importance 
only as a potential field of battle, a distant border area in which the oncoming enemy could be 
checked, pinned down, and ultimately destroyed” (Kerr 1967: 466). Eventually it became evident 
that Japan was losing ground to the Allies and that the Allies would eventually reach the 
mainland Japan. The I.J.A. was spread thin and Japan reinforced its forces in China and 
Manchuria to hold back the British, Chinese and the Soviets. They did not reinforce the Imperial 
Japan Army’s 32nd Army in Okinawa, but instead reinforced the mainland’s defenses. Although 
Okinawa was Japan’s last line of defense in in the south, and Japanese military leaders did little 
to prepare its defense.  
 Imperial High Command of Japan appointed Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima as the 
commander of the I.J.A. 32
nd
 Army in Okinawa, along with veteran General Isamu Cho and 
Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. Ushijima knew that he could not stop the Americans, so he decided 
to hold them off, and devised a three point: 1) one plane for one warship; 2) one boat for one 
warship; 3) one man for ten men or one enemy tank (Kerr 1967). The 32
nd
 Army conscripted 
thirty-nine thousand Okinawans between the ages of 18-45 in labor battalions to work eighteen 
hour work days, which made them comparable to slaves. Boeitai (or auxiliary troops called 
Home Guards) were sent to the frontlines (Kerr 1967). School students were also drafted: senior 
middle school boys became Iron and Blood Volunteers and senior school girls were trained for 
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medical service as the Himeyuri Student Corps, which were assigned to the frontlines (Thomas 
M. Huber 1990). Once invasion seemed imminent, Japanese military families were sent home 
and Okinawan parents with enough money sent their children to schools in the mainland, but 
civilians were not evacuated (Kerr 1967). Colonel Yahara devised a defensive stratagem, which 
had the 32
nd
 Army and the labor battalions fortify the southern island around Shuri and Naha 
with a labyrinth of cave entrenchments and bunkers (Werstein 1968).  
 U.S. air raids on Okinawa (March 1945) began before the end of the Battle of Iwo Jima 
(March 1945). Operation Iceberg began with continued heavy bombardments by naval and aerial 
assault before U.S. amphibious regiments landed. The Battle of Okinawa was known as the 
“Typhoo of Steel” because of the extensive amount of artillery, tanks, planes, and ammunition 
that was used during the operation (Kerr 1967). There were no U.S. casualties during their 
landing on the mid-western beaches of Okinawa and they quickly overran two airfields without 
meeting any resistance (Laura Lacey 2005; Werstein 1968). Several days later, U.S. forces met 
the fortified I.J.A. 32
nd
 Army in the south just north of Naha. Yahara’s entrenchments and 
bunkers survived the artillery assault and his strategy to fight from caves was successful at 
blocking U.S. forces (Werstein 1968). The U.S. advance was slow, but a suicide offensive urged 
by General Cho allowed U.S> forces to gain considerable ground. Before advancing, naval and 
aerial attacks bombed Shuri for over 48 hours before they broke through its 500 year-old 
stonewall (Werstein 1968). The U.S. troops advanced into Shuri as General Ushijima, Cho, and 
Colonel Yahara ordered Japanese forces to make a defensive retreat south. Although Shuri was 
captured and the 32
nd
 was retreating, Yahara’s defensive strategy inflicted heavy casualties on 
the U.S. forces (Werstein 1968).  
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 Shuri was captured in May, but the battle continued until 20 June 1945. The Battle for 
Okinawa lasted 89 days, much longer than U.S. military command anticipated, and included 
island jumping around the Ryukyu Islands (George Feifer 2001). The Battle of Okinawa was the 
bloodiest and most destructive campaign in the Pacific. The U.S. forces consisted of 540,000 
troops, of which 183 combat troops; the I.J. 32
nd
 Army of approximately 120,000 troops and 
30,000 conscripted Okinawans as Boeitai, Iron and Blood Volunteers and medics; and there was 
an estimated of 300,000, Okinawan civilians drawn into the battle (Bill Sloan 2007). By the end 
of the battle Shuri was demolished, the hill it sat on was leveled, and Naha was unrecognizable. 
U.S. casualties totaled 49,141 in which 12,520 killed or missing and 36,631 wounded; 
approximately 110,000 Japanese soldiers and conscripts were killed. Okinawans suffered the 
most, with an estimated 140,000 dead, maybe more, due to the bombardments, crossfire, suicide, 
but also from starvation, malnutrition, and disease (Feifer 2001). Although Japan’s occupation 
was ended, Okinawa lost about a third of their population and most of its historical relics.  
 There are countless stories that Japan forced Okinawans to commit or forced Okinawan 
men to kill their families because Japanese propagandists told them that U.S. troops would “rape 
their wives and eat their children” (Feifer 2001; Lacey 2005). There is evidence that the I.J.A. 
executed Okinawans accused of spying without a trial (Feifer 2001). Americans cleared out 
homes, caves and family tombs by throwing a grenade or shooting indiscriminately into them 
without regard to civilians who might be caught in the crossfire (Sloan 2007). Death was not the 
only atrocity Okinawans endured. Okinawans accused Japanese and Americans of rape during 
the war. For example, an article “Okinawan Nights” written by Lisa Cullen and published in 
Time on August 13, 2001 retold a story of three Americans who raped an Okinawan girl, which 
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prompted local villagers to kill the soldiers and bury them in a cave as retaliation. Okinawa 
caught between the interests of the government of Japan and the U.S. became a lasting them. 
 Rebuilding Okinawa 
 Even before the battle ended, the United States Civil Administration (USCA) began 
building additional camps and hospitals for refugees as the U.S. Army rebuilt bases and roads. 
USCA provided shelter and medical treatment while they evacuated civilians. The U.S. forces 
efficiently rebuilt military installations and airfields to prepare for the operation to invade 
mainland Japan. But the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki devastated Japan. Emperor 
Hirohito of Japan announced the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, but that did not stop 
Japanese violence against civilians in Kumejima, Okinawa.
11
 On 2 September1945, Japanese 
officials signed an unconditional surrender, which resulted in the acquisition of Okinawa by the 
United States for a period. The military confiscated 85 percent of Okinawa’s land in preparation 
for its invasion of mainland Japan (Kerr 1967). They confiscated land from displaced Okinawans 
that were evacuated by USCA. Army Base Command’s objective was to establish a permanent 
American stronghold in East Asia on Okinawa, but officials in Washington were uncertain about 
Okinawa’s development. The Atlantic Charter between the U.S. government and the British 
government agreed to not expand territories in other countries through violence. Washington 
officials were uncertain if establishing permanent bases broke the Atlantic Charter.   
 After the war, President Harry S. Truman and his administration were uncertain about 
procuring the Ryukyu Islands and establishing permanent bases there. U.S. Navy Colonel 
Murray governed military and civil administration on Okinawa. Colonel Murray wanted to 
maintain and secure bases in Okinawa. The U.S. military prioritized civilian problems second to 
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 Kumejima Massacre took place on an outer island of Okinawa, Kumejima.  
31 
securing the U.S. military’s foothold in East Asia because of the spread of communism. Okinawa 
was unrecognizable after the war. Villages, cities, roads, and vegetation was destroyed. 
Displaced Okinawans were moved continuously from one tent city to another, and suffered from 
overcrowding, starvation, and disease. The biggest problems Okinawans suffered were from a 
shortage of housing and food (Belote 1970). Although Japan had stored plenty of food rations in 
Okinawa, many starved. Poor road conditions made it difficult for USCA to deliver food t 
civilians (Belote 1970). Okinawa was hit by typhoons and torrential downpours; making it 
impossible for U.S. military vehicles to use the islands dirt roads. Displaced Okinawans were 
covered in lice and stricken with malaria and other diseases from poor living conditions. 
Shortages of basic supplies such as soap, homes and clean water perpetuate problems with 
disease control. The Navy used its resources for disease control, but the general conditions of 
Okinawans were considered very poor. There were no sewers, running water, or electricity 
available for Okinawan civilians (Sarantakes 2000). After John Caldwell, a scholar working for 
the military, suggested reviving Okinawan autonomy, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
proposed his goals for Okinawa’s recover, which included restoring property, improving health 
and sanitation, establish self-governing communities, institute economic development, and 
education.
12
 Caldwell suggested that locals should be provided land for farming for sustainable 
agriculture and given local authority over civilian problems (Sarantakes 2000). On 1 July 1946, 
the U.S. Naval administration transitioned all administrative duties to the Army’s U.S. Civil 
Administration (USCA). Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) held the title of 
Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.
13
 Okinawa was divided into mayoral subdivisions. Okinawans’ 
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 The Far East Command (FEC) in Tokyo was headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East, whom was titled 
the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.  
13
 SCAP refers to General Douglas MacArthur or his staff.  
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authority was limited to mayoral administration and local police. Mayors had little contact with 
USAC, aside from military memorandums. The local police were supposed to control civilians, 
but they had no authority over foreign military personnel. Okinawans were treated unfairly by 
foreign military forces, which made unwarranted raids on civilian homes. Paul H. Skuse 
(Director of Public Safety Army Base Service Command II [ABSCOM II]) and I.H. Rubenstein 
(Acting Director for USCA Legal Department) expressed continued concerns about the 
unwarranted search seizures of civilians by the military government to SCAP (Warner 1995). 
Skuse equated the search and seizures to the British oppression of colonial Americans (Warner 
1995). Okinawans specifically asked that Filipino forces be withdrawn (Warner 1995). After due 
consideration, SCAP removed Filipino forces from the Ryukyus and ordered USCA to obtain 
warrants for search and seizures (Warner 1995).  
Education 
 USCA sought to educate Okinawans as early as possible to promote Ryukyuan 
development and future sustainability, but the development of education programs was slow. 
Before the Battle of Okinawa concluded, USCA implemented an education initiative. Teachers 
taught classes with several hundred students in refugee camps wherever space was available 
(Japan International Cooperation Agency: Okinawa International Center 2006). Pre-war 
Okinawan teachers taught nationalistic Japanese militarism and were scarred to teach for USCA. 
These teachers had to be coerced by familiar Okinawan teachers and administrators that worked 
for USCA, but there was still a significant deficit of teachers (JICA: OIC 2006). Many qualified 
pre-war teachers avoided poverty by working for the military government in new fields. This left 
many lesser educated teaches to work in classroom. The pre-war campus or training new 
teachers and USCA needed to produce more teachers. The military government and USCA 
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created a new Ryukyuan Education program to train teachers. But to keep up with an increasing 
demand for teachers, USCA lowered the standards of the Ryukyuan Education program. The 
program expedited subpar teacher training in order to meet the quota. Thus, some of the better 
teachers were educated professionals from different background ds teaching students wherever 
they could.  
 Okinawa’s schools were short on books and other essential supplies, such as pencils and 
paper. Most school materials used before the Battle of Okinawa were destroyed and USCA had 
trouble keeping up with demand. Teachers were allowed to travel to Japan to raise money and 
materials for Okinawan school only after the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty in 1952. Compared with 
Ryukyu’s counterparts in mainland Japan, the Ryukyuan Education program produced under 
qualified teachers, poor or no teaching facilities, and no formal school system (Warner 1995). 
Teachers were able to organize shortly after the military government’s Directive #7 
(Warner 1995). Teachers established the Okinawan Federation of Education and requested 
compensation for teachers’ relocation after graduating from the Ryukyuan Education program, 
the reestablishment of a functional school system, building materials for school, and school 
supplies. Elementary education was a low priority for the military government. The military 
government saw elementary education as a means to organize and control the population during 
and after the war. English speaking Okinawan professionals were more important to military 
operations on Okinawa. 
The military government heavily invested Government and Relief in Occupied Areas 
funds to educate qualified students in Continental United States colleges or universities. The 
military government could not hire Okinawan civil service employment because the language 
barrier prevented Okinawans to communicate effectively with military personnel. Okinawans 
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needed to be fluent, or at the least efficient, in English so that could employ them for direct and 
indirect base functions. Okinawans that returned from the continental United States with a 
Government and Relief in Occupied Areas education were fluent in English. But the military 
found that the Okinawans were unqualified for the jobs the military needed them the most 
(Warner 1995). The military’s plan failed to educate Okinawans for professional occupations on 
U.S. bases. Educated Okinawans, efficient in English, were more likely to enter military 
employment, because it offered better pay and benefits than civilian occupations in Okinawa.  
 Government and Politics 
 Okinawa’s social and economic recovery was slower than Japan’s recovery. Political 
parties under USCA administration were limited to small districts and had no authority over the 
U.S. military. Political parties reorganized frequently during the early years of military 
occupation. Between 1946 and 1951, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, Okinawa Democratic 
League, and Okinawa Socialist Party amalgamated into the Republican Party, which became the 
conservative pro-U.S. Ryukyu Democratic Party in 1952. Political parties and USCA focused on 
subsistence, food security, and transportation. USCA provided land for farmers and permitted 
offshore fishing for fishermen. But USCA limited Okinawans to selling their products within 
Okinawa. Public transportation was nonexistent. The war destroyed Okinawa’s railways and 
roads. Typhoons made dirt roads impassable by civilian cars and buses. USA eventually supplied 
Ryukyuans with 2 ½ ton trucks with four-wheel-drive to bus civilian base workers – suitable for 
the island’s muddy road conditions (Warner 1995). Washington officials’ indecisiveness caused 
Okinawa’s reconstruction to stagnate. According to Japan’s surrender agreement, Japan was 
supposed to fund Okinawa’s reconstruction, but Japan had no post-war economic surplus and 
contributed little to the reconstruction efforts (Sarantakes 2000).  
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 Okinawa’s reconstruction efforts were inhibited by war time agreements between Allied 
forces. SCAP General, Douglas MacArthur, suggested that the U.S. annex Okinawa (Hara 2007). 
Annexation would have provided the U.S. government with the rights to administer civil law, 
land seizures, and constructions. But officials in Washington felt that Okinawa was an economic 
burden and annexation would have violated the Atlantic Charter 1947, which stipulated that the 
British and the Americans could not seize territories from the war (Hara 2007). The Soviet Union 
and China saw reconstructing civil administration before obtaining the rights to Okinawa as 
annexation (Hara 2007). Russia and China denounced the U.S. presence on Okinawa and 
supported Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. None of the major post-war agreements like the Cairo 
Declaration, Potsdam Declaration, and the Yalta Agreement mentioned the Ryukyu Islands. The 
Language in many treaties regarded the Ryukyus as minor islands and never specified what 
should happen to “Ryukyu” or “Okinawa.” The vague language allowed U.S. officials 
considerable flexibility when they drafted the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  
  The confiscated land used by RYCOM became an important legal issue for officials in 
Washington. The land was legally appropriate according to the Army Field Manual 27-10 (FM 
27-10), “The Law of Land Warfare.” FM 27-10 stipulated that public and abandoned private 
property captured on the battlefield became property of the United States. Immoveable private 
property could not be confiscated, but it could be requisitioned, if deemed necessary for military 
operations. The military must provide a receipt of payment if any immoveable property or 
moveable property, such as homes, were requisitioned.  
 During the U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. officials were determined to demilitarize 
Japan. Japan’s war industry and military had largely disintegrated. General MacArthur sought to 
reconstruct Japan as a pacifist nation, an Asian Switzerland (Edwin O. Reischaur 1981). SCAP 
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drafted Japan’s constitution and modeled it after Japan’s pre-1930 constitution, which was 
similar to Great Britain’s. Japan’s new constitution renounced war and the war potential forever 
(Reischaur 1981). The Diet of Japan returned to its pre-1930s legislative structure as the sole 
law-making branch. Japan’s new constitution took effect in May 1947, but it did not include 
Okinawa. Japan was self-sufficient in administration and economy much earlier than Okinawa. 
Although Japan was heavily bombed during the war, many industrial sectors and farming land 
were untouched. Japan had a functioning transportation system, such as roads and railroads.  
 International Environment and Politics 
 Redevelopment in Okinawa lagged behind Japan. SCAP officials were reluctant to 
develop Okinawa before the wartime agreements were settled. Controlling sanitation and health 
proved to be a difficult task, and education remained a low priority of USCA, except for 
university education. USCA appropriated enough money to build the University of the Ryukyus 
in 1950 on the spot Shurijo Castle once stood. The University of the Ryukyus was built under the 
auspices of USCA and in conjunction with the University of Michigan. The University of 
Michigan and USCA provided an exchange program that allowed Okinawans to study in the 
Continental United States.  
 The threat of communist expansion in Asia evolved Washington officials’ protection 
“from” Japan into the protection “of” Japan. Civil war in China forced Republic of China’s 
(ROC) leader Chiang Kai-shek to escape to Taiwan. The communist party then established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). In North Korea communists established the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Pact 
with the Republic of Korea (ROK). The North Koreans invaded South Korea in June 1950, U.S. 
and U.N. forces joined the war on behalf of the deal. General MacArthur was named 
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Commander in Chief of U.S. and U.N. forces, providing food, air, and ground support to the 
government in the South. China supported North Korea. MacArthur’s request for logistical 
support from U.S. facilities in Japan was denied by the government in Tokyo. As a result 
Ryuukyu Command (RYCOM) provided logistical support for Allied Forces, which got the 
Ruyukyus involved in the war. On 28 July 1950, RYCOM reorganized the Government of 
Ryukyu Islands (GRI) in order to redirect the U.S. military’s attention on the conflict in Korea.  
 The San Francisco Peace Treaty officially ended the war between Japan and Allied 
Powers.
14
 It stipulated that Japan renounce claims to territories taken by force or acquired by pre-
war agreements. Tokyo officials were unclear about their stance on whether or not Okinawa was 
a part of Japan. In Article 3, Japan agreed the Ryukyu Islands would be placed under U.S. 
trusteeship with the U.S. government as sole administrative power. The U.S. military had the 
power of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the Ryukyus and its inhabitants. The 
treaty’s language was vague about the Ryukyus’ future and sovereignty. The Ryukyus’ vague 
future permitted the U.S. government to use the islands without taking full responsibility 
(Eldridge 2013). John Foster Dulles, Councilor to the Secretary of State, was the chief U.S. 
negotiator of the treaty. In his address to the San Francisco Peace Conference, Dulles restated 
Article 3, but added that the U.S. government would permit Japan residual sovereignty over the 
Ryukyus (Dulles Speech 1951). Dulles’ use of the phrase “residual sovereignty” suggested that 
the United States might return to Japan. Dulles reasoned that the inhabitants of the Ryukyus were 
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 All Allied Powers signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty except for the Soviet Union and the Republic of China 
in Taiwan (Formosa). The Soviet Union and Japan signed a Joint Declaration in 1956 to officially end the war. ROC 
was not invited to participate in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The governments in China and Japan signed the 
Treaty of Taipei shortly before the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It officially ended the war and Japan renounced 
Taiwan and recognized its inhabitants as nationals of the Republic of China in Taiwan.  
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ethnically similar to Japan. China protested Dulles’ statement, though they supported the return 
of the Ryukyus to Japan (Eldridge 2013).  
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Chapter 3 - U.S. Occupation 
At the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Conference, Okinawa went through 
several important administrative, social, and economical changes. RYCOM reorganized the 
military and civilian government to focus on developing its “Keystone to the Pacific.” RYCOM 
continued to requisition private property on top of the property it appropriated before the treaty 
and conference. This aggravated Okinawan landowners who objected to their poor treatment by 
the military regime and the legality of RYCOM’s seizure of private property. Ten year after the 
Battle of Okinawa, Okinawa’s livelihood was still threatened by starvation, disease, bulldozers, 
and armed soldiers. The 1950s were, arguably, the most contentious period in Okinawan history 
Okinawan farmers, communists, socialists, university students, working union, and teaching 
unions came together against RYCOM. Each group was established for different social concerns, 
but they amalgamated against the military regime and the overarching issue of its land 
acquisition policies.  
During the 1950s, RYCOM reorganized USCA into the U.S. Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyus (USCAR). By 1957, the offices of governor, held by SCAP, and deputy governor, held 
by the head of USCA, were abolished. They were replaced by an army general called the High 
Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands (HICOM). Officials in Washington directed USCAR to 
assist the civilian government, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, to be more self-sufficient 
in developing economic and social standards. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands was 
officially established in 1952 and was a functioning government by the time HICOM was 
established (Warner 1995). The Government of the Ryukyu Islands was composed of a publicly 
elected executive council headed by a Chief Executive. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands 
had the legislative, executive, and judiciary authority over all matters concerning Okinawan 
40 
natives. Although the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was established, HICOM ultimately 
chose the Government of the Ryukyu Islands Chief Executive and had the power to veto the 
Ryukyu government’s executive decisions. Throughout the U.S. occupation, the government of 
the Ryukyu Islands was dominated by pro-U.S. Liberal Democratic Party members. Unions and 
worker associations found little representation in the domestic Okinawan government.  
 U.S. officials in HICOM and USCAR viewed trade unions as communist and spoke 
aggressively against the formation of unions. In 1952, the Okinawan Federation of Education 
became the Okinawa Teachers Association. As an association the Okinawa Teachers Association 
received tax free status, limited government subsidies, and its activities were left were left almost 
completely alone – under USCAR’s scrutiny. The OTA’s members would not have been able to 
participate in political activities if it was a union. A union’s sole purpose was to seek better 
employment conditions for its members. Thus a union could have fought for supplies, wage 
increases, building materials, and training allowances. Whereas an association received tax free 
status, limited government subsidies, and the U.S. military left almost completely alone. When 
the OTA leader expressed their interest in changing their status to a union, RYCOM’S deputy 
governor characterized the Okinawa Teachers Association as communist, inspired by communist 
ideologies. RYCOM held the same views towards the Okinawan labor movement. Supported by 
the Okinawa People’s Party, and “All Okinawa Labor Council” was formed by nine unregistered 
unions, but the council disintegrated after government officials and employers harassed them 
(Warner 1997).  
 The Okinawa Teachers Association was not represented in the Government of the 
Ryukyu Islands and education was neglected by USCAR funds. Although USCAR helped found 
the University of the Ryukyus, education was a low priority for the military government. The 
41 
OTA and the Council for Reversion Chief Executive, Yara Chobyo, campaigned throughout 
Japan to obtain financial aid from Japan for school books, building materials, and necessary 
school supplied in Okinawa. Yara ran for public office after he retired from the Okinawa 
Teachers Association and the Council for Reversion. He won public office as the mayor of Naha 
in 1957.  
 After the rape and murder of a six-year-old Okinawan girl in 1995 a mass rally was 
mobilized to demand the conviction of the assailant. Although the assailant was convicted in a 
U.S. court-martial, his appeal allowed in to return the United States and was freed. With the 
increased protests in 1955, the GRI Legislature sent a report to the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions . Legislators expressed concern about the continuing issues of land payments 
by the United States and the violations of workers’ human rights in the Ryukyus. Labor 
representatives from Japan, Philippines, and the United States were appointed as delegates by the 
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS to review the allegations 
made by workers in the Ryukyu Islands. ICTFU delegates found that workers in the Ryukyus 
experienced low wages, inflated prices, and poor working conditions. The ICTFU recommended 
that the USCAR raised its minimum wage to compensate for inflation and provide adequate 
facilities for Okinawan workers. The INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE 
TRADE UNIONS state that a worker had the right to join or form a union.  
 The unfair practices of the military government sparked contentious organizations 
throughout the 1950s for a multitude of reasons. Reversionists’, such as the Okinawa Teachers 
Association and other worker unions, goal was to return Okinawa to Japan so they could reclaim 
Japanese citizenship. Landowner unions wanted fair rents. Radical students at the University the 
Ryukyus wanted to fight against American Colonialism. Farmers from mainland Okinawa’s 
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outer islands, Ie Jima, fought for their farms against RYCOM’s land appropriation.15 Okinawa 
was riddled with rallies, demonstrations, and protests throughout the 1950s. Working unions 
went on strike against USCAR’s unfair wage practices and poverty stricken farmers went on a 
“beggars march” through Naha.  
 The Episode for Landowners 
 Political opposition to RYCOM’s use of private property without paying for it grew 
during this period. Land was a pressing issue for the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and the 
U.S. military. RYCOM explained that the Ryukyus were a conquered enemy territory. Although 
officials in RYCOM and in Washington were reluctant to build Okinawa, they had no problem 
seizing land from local residents to build military installations. In one incident, USCAR seized 
land in the middle of the night, even after residents protested against expropriation the day 
before. USCAR forcefully removed 32 families, tore down their homes, and began building on 
the site. USCAR did not always observe FM 27-10 regulations when they did not compensate 
landowners who lost their land and homes to U.S. military occupation. USCAR had trouble 
determining who owned land, how to pay the owners, and when they could compensate 
landowners. It was difficult for landowners to prove their claims to land because many displaced 
Okinawans had lost their land titles during the war and many Japanese government records such 
as town registries were destroyed.  
 Even when RYCOM could identify landowners, they needed to compute a reasonable 
rental payment. RYCOM occupied 42,726 acres of private property. USCAR used the value of 
the U.S. dollar and the cost of land in mainland Japan over a ten year span, which estimated the 
occupied land at $73,943,035 (Inoue 2004). USCAR officials explained the amount was too high 
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 Ie Jima is a northwestern island off of mainland Okinawa.  
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because it risked Okinawa’s economy to inflation. USCAR deflated the estimate by using 
Okinawa’s devalued version of the yen and Okinawa’s price rate of land ten years prior to World 
War II. The U.S. military government offered Okinawan landowners $40,562,161 in a one ten-
year lump sum payment. 
 The Government of the Ryukyu Islands opposed USCAR’s offer by passing the 
“Petitions Relating to the Processing of Military Land,” also known as the “Four Principles for 
Land Protection” resolution. Okinawan legislators demanded for options other than lump sum 
payments because it did not accurately represent economic growth and price inflation. Okinawan 
government officials wanted the United States to appropriately compensate Okinawan land 
owners for the land they occupied and any property that was damaged by the U.S. military. The 
Four Principles for Land Protection opposed any new and expropriation by the United States. 
The Okinawan officials’ petition attempted to limit the U.S. occupation permanency in Okinawa. 
The “Four Principles” were popular with organizations such as the Okinawa People’s Party and 
the Okinawa Teachers Association. The resolution reached Washington officials and prompted 
U.S. Congress to send a Special Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, House of 
Representatives, on an inspection tour of the Far East.  
 The special subcommittee reviewed Okinawa for three days. The chairman of the special 
subcommittee, Representative Melvin Price, wrote a report on acquisitions and payments and a 
variety of other problems. The “Price Report” proclaimed that the bases in the Far East were 
important, but the acquisitions of land by the U.S. forces should be limited. The Price Report 
recommended that any land, especially arable soil, be returned expeditiously. If the military 
needed to acquire additional land, it should do so in moderation. The report did not acknowledge 
that many Okinawans wanted independence or a reversion to Japan. It supported the idea of a 
44 
long term U.S. military presence on the island and of a lump sum payment for lands acquired by 
the United States. The report did not suggest limiting the storage of nuclear weapons on 
Okinawa. The Price Report ignited island-wide protests for violating the “Four Principles.” 
 Approximately 200,000 Okinawans, one quarter of the total population, in 56 different 
cities, towns, and village rallied against Price’s report. Many landowners expressed support for 
Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. Activists included the politicians, teachers, union workers, 
farmers, and students. The island-wide support was short lived because RYCOM offered land 
owners payment. Many of the landowners accepted the payments because it substantially 
increased their income. The landowners’ organization fell apart among themselves and their 
supporters. USCAR coerced other landowners and their supporters by threatening their political 
careers and businesses. For instance, USCAR adopted an “off limit” policy, which prevented 
service men and their families from visiting certain civilian areas in Okinawa. The “off limit” 
policy hurt Okinawan businesses that relied on military clientele for business, especially in the 
entertainment districts.  
 Landowners abandoned the “Four Principles” by opting for lease contracts. The protest 
community based the Four Principles on the landowners’ problem with the United States’ unjust 
use of their land. Although RYCOM’s payments diffused the land disputes, a few landowners 
defied the United States. Some landowners owned as little as one “tsubo” of occupied land in 
order to protest against the U.S. occupation.
16
 Reversion organizations set off on a movement to 
return to Japan and left the rental problems with RYCOM to the landowners that abandoned the 
“Four Principles for Land Protection.”  
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 Tsubo is a Japanese unit of measurement for pricing land. It is the equivalent to two tatami mats. (Tanji 2006); 
Cooley and Martin 2006; Inoue 2007).  
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 The United States undermined the “Four Principles” protest community by targeting the 
landowners. The landowners’ struggle against land appropriation was the focal point of the 
protest community. The supporters of the landowners’ against the United States’ land 
appropriation distanced themselves from the issues, but did not diffuse completely. The protest 
communities focused on organization specific issues. Labor unions protested against unsafe 
working conditions. Teacher associations demanded for a better education system. Labor unions, 
teacher associations, and civil-servants demanded for better wages. Meanwhile, protest 
communities realized Okinawa fell further behind Japan’s social and economic development.  
 Economic Development 
 The government of Japan publicly offered Okinawa aid after the economy in Japan 
stabilized in the late 1950s. Japanese officials offered to aid Okinawa’s development during the 
1960s in exchange for administrative power. Japan’s offer for aid perpetuated the reversionist 
sentiment in Okinawa and Japan. Rumors began that officials from the United States and Japan 
were discussing Okinawa’s return to Japan. HICOM refused to exchange administrative power 
for financial aid, which intensified the reversionist sentiment. HICOM attempted to abate the 
rumors of negotiations for Okinawa’s reversion between the U.S. and Japanese governments. 
U.S. policy-makers repeatedly compared Okinawa’s social and economic advantage under the 
U.S. administration to Imperial Japan’s administration.17 The social and economic gap between 
Okinawa and Japan was not ignored by Okinawans.
18
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U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. 1962. To Amend the Act of Providing for the Economic and Social 
development in the Ryukyu Islands(H.R. 10937). Washington: Government Printing Office. B)-----. 1967. To 
Authorize the Extension of Certain Naval Vessel Loans Now in Existence, and for Other Purposes. (To Accompany 
H.R. 12910)…(H.R. 9796). Washington: Government Printing Office.   
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 HICOM and politicians were aware of the problems from Okinawans comparing themselves with Japan during the 
U.S. military occupation. In Congressional meetings, policy-makers noted the importance of closing the social and 
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 The first task of U.S. officials increased aid to social and financial institutions, and 
allowed external aid to Okinawa from the government of Japan. Washington and Tokyo officials 
publicly demonstrated steps to establish an agreement for financial aid at meetings by the 
Japanese Prime Minister and U.S. President during the 1960s. HICOM and U.S. officials refused 
to relinquish administrative powers to Japan’s government. The U.S. government feared that 
Japan would undermine the legitimacy of the United States’ occupation of Okinawa. The 
governments of Japan and the United States established a process that allowed Japan to finance 
HICOM approved social and economic programs. 
 By 1961, Japan was capable of financing employment in Okinawa.
19
 At the time, the 
United States provided HICOM with only $6 million. In 1961, President Kennedy directed 
Congress to increase HICOM’s annual budget from $6 million to $12 million (Inoue 2004). 
Congress approved the amendment for the budget increase in 1962, but the amount of financial 
aid was debated thereafter. The increased budget was important for financing rising costs and 
deterred growing demands from the reversion movement. With the Help of Senator Price, 
HICOM continued to campaign for increased appropriations from Congress. Throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic welfare gaps between Okinawa and Japan, as a means to abate reversionist sentiments and supporters. A 
few documents include: a) National Security Action Memorandum (No. 68). 1961. Ryukyu Islands: Task Force 
Report, 1961: November-December. B)U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. 1966. To Amend… the Act of 
Providing for the Economic And Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands. (To Accompany 14088). Washington: 
Government Printing Office. C)-----. 1967. O Authorize the Extension of Certain Naval Vessel Loans Now in 
Existence, and for Other Purposes. (To Accompany H.R. 12910)… (H.R. 9796). Washington: Government Printing 
Office.  
19
 Act of July 12, 1960 (Public Law 86-629), also known as the Price Act or rice Bill, set HICOM’s budget ceiling to 
$6 million per annum. Melvin Price expressed their concern that the government of Japan could out finance the U.S. 
government.  
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1960s, the budget was debated in Congress and was eventually increase to $25 million annually 
in 1967.
20
  
 Technicians, engineer, and other laborers from Okinawa were integral to vase operations. 
RYCOM’s early occupation used foreign technicians from allied powers such as the Philippines. 
But USCAR trained Okinawans to replace foreign technicians and engineers, though it paid them 
much lower wages. A foreign engineer earned $263.00 per month; whereas an Okinawan earned 
$60 per month (Kerr 1967). This wage scale undermined HICOM’s mission because it did little 
to assist the reinvestment of Okinawa’s economy. According to HICOM’s 1961 Task Force 
Report Okinawans working as U.S. employees were paid as much as their Japanese equivalents, 
but did not receive fringe benefits like private Japanese employees.
21
 However, USCAR did not 
offer additional benefits such as severance pay, sick or maternity leave, or maternity allowances 
to Okinawan civilian workers. The base pay for privately employed workers’ base pay in Japan 
accounted for about fifty percent compensation. Whereas the base pay for USCAR workers in 
Okinawa accounted for their total compensation. On average, a Japanese employee’s total 
compensation exceeded an Okinawan’s total compensation by fifty percent. Hence, only 
educated USCAR employed Okinawans could earn the minimum amount of privately employed 
Japanese citizens.  
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 Okinawa’s economic reliance on the military bases was seen as a current and future 
problem by HICOM. Okinawa’s economic dependency on the military began early on. 22 SCAP 
made little to promote industry in Okinawa, except for minor contributions to agriculture and 
fishing. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, HICOM promoted economic autonomy for Okinawa 
to Congress; so long it did not affect U.S. military security and interests.  
 Agriculture was the industry least dependent on the base economy.
23
 HICOM even 
allowed farmers who owned land occupied by the military to farm on its bases. During the U.S. 
occupation, Okinawa’s major crops were sugar cane, sweet potatoes, and pineapples. Okinawa 
cultivated sugar cane and sweet potatoes for centuries, but pineapples were introduced to 
Okinawa In the early 20
th
 century as a cash crop by Imperial Japan. Pineapples require 
Okinawa’s specific subtropical climate, which is not available anywhere else in Japan. Although 
Okinawa’s temperament is ideal for farming pineapples, Okinawa’s history with typhoons and 
limited arable land kept pineapples from being a major cash crop. Yet USCAR promoted 
pineapples as a major crop. USCAR promoted trade between local farmers and military 
personnel, but the agricultural industry relied heavily on the Japanese market, especially for its 
sugar. HICOM used appropriated money to commission consultants from Taiwan to improve 
Okinawa’s subtropical agricultural development (U.S. Senate 1960). But Okinawa’s agriculture 
industry was also limited by the acquisition of arable land by U.S. bases. 
 HICOM and the Government of Ryukyu Island officials needed to build industries to 
alleviate Okinawa’s dependency on the military bases. Okinawa did not have the political 
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 During a 1948 visit by US diplomat George Kennan, General Macarthur commented that Okinawans, 
characterized as simple and good-natured, would be content with an American base economy (Aldous 2003; Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1948, vol. VI, United States p. 701). 
23
 General Mead and Congressman Christmas to the U.S. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Mutual Security 
Appropriations for 1961. 86 H.R. 12619. March 11, 1960.  
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leverage needed to make economic decisions, even on commercial transportation. Traveling to 
Okinawa was difficult for foreign tourists, except from those from the United States or Japan. 
HICOM required a rigorous visa process and limited transportation for foreign tourist (David 
Grubnick 1969). HICOM only permitted foreign tourists to fly using the United States’ Civil Air 
Transportation. The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated the Civil Air 
Transportation. The CIA used the Civil Air Transportation for reconnaissance throughout Asia 
during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Okinawa was used as fueling station between Korea and 
Thailand, rather than a major exporter of Okinawan goods (Frank Wisner 1952). Okinawa’s 
potential for its transportation industry and even as a trading zone (by air and sea) was restricted 
by HICOM’s authority and endless red tape.  
 Accepting the Bases 
 Okinawa’s economy relied, directly and indirectly, on the military bases. The military 
bases were a source of income for landowners, job opportunities for locals, and potential 
customers for services provided by business around the bases: tire rebuilding, general garages, 
laundries, and entertainment districts. Many people within the poorer districts of Okinawa saw 
the bases as their best means for local economic development. The mayor of Kushi Village, 
Nago District, approved the U.S. military’s plans to build another military base (Camp Schwab). 
The mayor’s decision contradicted the “Four Principles” movement’s rhetoric. The mayor 
apologized but explained that the Kushi Village needed the base for economic development. Kin 
Village in a neighboring district, Kunigami District, followed Kushi Village’s example and 
accepted the construction of another military base (Camp Hansen). 
 In order to accommodate the bases, the military government and local village built an 
entertainment district with theaters, hotels, bars, and shops (Fukumura 2007). Accepting the 
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military base(s) restructured the local community’s infrastructure. Local governments promoted 
entertainment districts and residents established private businesses to host potential American 
customers. Overall, low-resource communities viewed the military bases as their best means for 
economic revitalization. Village administrations were more concerned about their economy than 
the island-wide opposition of military land acquisitions.  
 Prostitution was common in these entertainment districts and was closely related to bars 
and hotels. Prostitution catered to military personnel and was a major contributor to local 
economies. At one point, one-in-thirty Okinawan women were employed as prostitutes 
(Fukumura 2007). Yehundi Cohen (1958 argued that prostitution reflected the instability of 
family and community, as a result of the Battle of Okinawa and U.S. occupation. Prostitutes in 
Okinawa never worked in their home villages and traveled across mainland Okinawa to find 
work (Cohen 1958). Bars hired prostitutes from Okinawa, the Philippines, Korea, and China, to 
serve American and Okinawan men (Fukuruma 2007). The criminalization of prostitution was 
rarely enforced, even though soliciting and conducting sexual acts for money was illegal in 
Japan. HICOM only deemed certain establishments “off-limits” if the spread of disease 
threatened military personnel.  
 The officials in Tokyo accepted the U.S. military’s use of Okinawa as a base.24 The 
Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and in Okinawa welcomed the U.S. military. Okinawa 
provided two important services for Japan. First, it limited common social problems caused by 
U.S. troops in a foreign country. Second, it allowed Tokyo to support U.S. military endeavors in 
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 Okinawa, as a whole, is referred to as a base in the National Security Action Memorandum (No. 68). 1961. 
Ryukyu Islands: Task Force Report, 1961: November-December. HICOM requested a survey of Okinawa’s social 
and economic development and this was the resulting report. On top of an analysis of Okinawa’s social and 
economic development, the report included information about the United States and Japan’s position on Okinawa.  
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Asia without mainland Japan being directly involved in violent conflicts. Although government 
officials in Japan welcomed the development of bases in Okinawa rather than in Japan, they 
continuously expressed their desire for administrative rights in Okinawa.
25
 Japanese officials 
offered financial aid to Okinawa in exchange for administrative rights, but HICOM refused. 
1960, a joint communiqué between Washington and Tokyo officials announced that bilateral 
assistance for Okinawa’s economy would begin. The United States refused the government of 
Japan’s request for administrative rights, but Japanese officials gained increase influence in 
Japanese interests in Okinawa. Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party funded Okinawa’s Liberal 
Democratic Party to promote Japan’s interests in Okinawa.  
 Tourism 
 The U.S. base economy helped develop Okinawa’s service industries. Although the 
service industry focused on serving U.S. military personnel, basic service functions and 
infrastructures were built to accompany them. Local economies throughout Okinawa had the 
basic infrastructure to host tourism, but these communities were not part of the tourist industry. 
HICOM was ambivalent about tourism. Although HICOM did not appropriate money to develop 
tourism, they did not attempt to discourage it.  
 HICOM and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands did not pursue tourism as a viable 
industry for economic development. Tourism contributed very little money to Okinawa’s 
economy (Kakazu 2011). Tourist businessmen convinced the Government of the Ryukyu Islands 
to promote tourism and create the Okinawa Tourist Association (Kakazu 2011). The Okinawa 
Tourist Association received little funding and little support from the Government of the Ryukyu 
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 The report mentioned that the Government of Japan publicly spoke favorably about Okinawa’s return, but did not 
seriously pursue the topic. National Security Action Memorandum (No. 68). 1961. Ryukyu Islands: Task Force 
Report, 1961: November-December.  
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Islands, USCAR, and Tokyo. During the 1950s, the Okinawa Tourist Association designed 
sightseeing courses, training tour guides, posting signs, holding exhibitions of Okinawa goods, 
and hosting important mainland politicians and businessmen (Figal 2008). Tourism did not 
receive institutional recognition until 1961, when the Government of the Ryukyu Islands created 
the Tourism Bureau. Although Okinawan officials recognized that tourism had potential, little 
was done to promote it. Figal (2008) explained that the Okinawa Tourist Association had two 
major complaints about Okinawans perception of tourism. First, they said that Okinawans lacked 
“tourism consciousness,” which meant that Okinawans did not recognize Okinawa’s potential as 
a tourist destination. Second, they said that Okinawa did not know to host foreign visitors. These 
two problems perpetuated Japanese tourists’perception of Okinawans kind as kind but “dull-
witted” (Figal 2008).  
 In 1962, the Okinawa Tourism Association commissioned Senge Tetsuma, the executive 
managing director of the Japanese National Park Association, to evaluate Okinawa’s tourism 
industry (Figal 2008). Senge recommended remedies for Okinawa’s tourism problems and 
suggested how the industry might appeal to mainland Japanese tourists. First, he said that 
Okinawa’s heritage tourism was lackluster. Tourists could embark on “colorful tours” of 
villages, but Okinawa as a whole lacked the image of a tourist spot (Grubnick 1965). Senge 
recommended that Okinawa to offer more cultural performances and distinctive “Ryukyuan” 
culture such as: Eisa (ceremonial drum dancing), tug of war and bullfighting events, glass and 
ceramic making, dragonboat races, and classical and folk Ryukyuan music and dance (Figal 
2008). He said that these activities might appeal to mainland tourists, but he noted that 
Okinawans did not recognize that day-to-day activities or scenery (nice weather and beaches) 
were attractions and that they lacked “tourism consciousness” (Grubnick 1965; Figal 2008).  
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 Cultural heritage sights were limited to war memorials and the rebuilt Shureimon Gate.
26
 
Bus tours were popular with mainland Japanese and were praised by Senge (Figal 2008). Tour 
bus visited various battle sites and war memorials like the Himeyuri Corps Monument. 
Shureimon Gate was popular with the bus tours, but Senge criticized its setting amidst the 
University of the Ryukyus modern concrete buildings (Figal 2008). A.M. Rosenthal (1961) 
argued that Okinawa’s appeal to Japanese tourists was the effects of the “enormous Western 
fortress in East” had on Okinawa’s daily life. Rosenthal (1961) explained that entertainment 
districts clearly demonstrated what effects the base had local life. Okinawan businesses focused 
on the “American Way” with pizza shops, “bars” with Okinawan hostesses entertaining U.S. 
troops, pawn shops, and clubs. Okinawa businesses focused on what Americans wanted and did 
not expand their market to include Japanese tourists.  
 Senge and other consultants for Okinawa’s tourism suggested that Okinawa was missing 
“Southern Island” feel (Figal 2008). Senge recommended Okinawa to tropicalize their landscape 
with nonindigenous flora that Japanese tourists expected to see (Figal 2008). During the 1960s, 
the Okinawa Tourism Association and Tourism Bureau began reforesting peace and war 
memorials with hibiscuses, banyan trees, and other nonindigenous flora (Figal 2008). Senge 
wanted to groom Okinawa to meet Japanese tourists’ image of it: “(1) islands south of Kyushu 
having beautiful southern island scenery; (2) having tropical and subtropical weather with warm 
winters; (3) green islands of abundant tropical and subtropical vegetation; (4) having a unique, 
distinctive culture; (5) a place where Battle of Okinawa sites can be seen; and (6) the location of 
U.S. strategic bases: (Figal 2008: 96).  
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 Shureimon Gate, or the “Gate of Courtesy,” was built to honor the Ryukyu Kingdom’s title, “Land of Propriety” 
in the 14
th
 century. The Shureimon Gate was destroyed during the Battle of Okinawa. It was rebuilt by USCAR and 
Government of Ryukyu Islands’ efforts in 1958 (Kerr 1967; Tanji 2006).  
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 Shopping was a major incentive for mainland Japanese to visit Okinawa in the 1950s and 
1960s. Luxury items were lightly taxed in Okinawa. Japanese tourists found shopping to be a 
bargain compared to buying more heavily taxed products on the mainland (Grubnick 1965). The 
Okinawa Tourism Association and the Tourism Bureau tried to meet Senge’s grooming 
recommendations, but needed to keep prices low too. By 1965, Okinawa’s shopping tourism 
drained sales from Japan, a development that worried government officials in Tokyo. To the 
surprise of American and Okinawan businessmen the Japanese government severely limited the 
amount of tax-free luxury items that Japanese tourists were allowed to bring (Grubnick 1965). 
The U.S. occupation was already an obstacle to tourism, in 1965, so was the government of 
Japan. Although the government’s legislation came as a shock, tourists from Japan were 
increasing in the late 1960s. Visitors, mostly from Japan, increased by 32% and their 
expenditures amounted to $29 million (increase of 20%) from 1966 to 1967 (New York Times 
1969).  
 On the Road to Japan 
 Although the 1950s island-wide support for landowners disintegrated, Okinawa was still 
politically turbulent during the 1960s. By the end of the 1950s, U.S. troops began fighting in 
Vietnam. In 1961, the United States tripled the amount of troops in Vietnam, and tripled then 
again in 1962. Okinawa served as a pit-stop for soldiers and logistical support was sent to 
Vietnam. The surge of troops and logistical support created jobs for Okinawans and increased 
revenue for local business owners. Businesses around Camp Schwab and Camp Hansen, in the 
Henoko district, prospered from newly built entertainment districts. Although businesses 
prospered, crimes and accidents committed by U.S. military personnel rose in residential and 
business areas throughout Okinawa. Images of the Vietnam War perpetuated Okinawans’ fear of 
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retribution by enemies because the U.S. military kept biological and nuclear weapons on 
Okinawa.  
 Military accidents and crimes committed by U.S. personnel increased with the surge of 
U.S. troops in Okinawa. In 1959, a fighter jet crashed in to a primary school during a training 
exercise. The crash killed 17 and injured 121, but the pilot survived (Japan Times Online 2009). 
In 1965, a military vehicle fell from a plane and crushed a school girl to death in Yomitan village 
near Kadena Air Station. The exact number of accidents before 1972, but traffic accidents caused 
by U.S. military personnel angered many Okinawans. The local police and the Government of 
the Ryukyu Islands had little authority over these cases. The High Commissioner made the final 
verdict, which was commonly “not guilty,” or a lenient punishment. Locals were rarely able to 
follow up on most cases. 
 Okinawa proved to be strategically advantageous during the wars in Korean and 
Vietnam. U.S. officials repeatedly proclaimed their determination to stay in Okinawa. In a State 
of the Union Message in 1954, President Eisenhower stated, “We shall maintain indefinitely our 
bases in Okinawa.” Deputy Governor of the Ryukyus, Maj. General Ogden, also announced, “… 
U.S. military bases on Okinawa cannot be separated from administrative authority.” Japan was 
eventually allowed to help USCAR fiscally, but was no granted substantiate administrative 
authority. In 1960, Washington officials asserted its dominance over Tokyo and Okinawa by 
updating the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA): “The Mutual Cooperation and Security Agreement between Japan and the United States 
of America 1960.” The reversionists protested against SOFA because it disproportionately 
favored the U.S. occupation. Article IV of SOFA removed any obligations of the United States to 
return Japanese facilities to their former state. SOFA exempted U.S. personnel from Japanese 
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passport and visa laws and regulations. It forced Japan and Okinawa to accept all U.S. driving 
permits and licenses, including civilian. The Government of Japan agreed to exempt U.S. 
military personnel from property taxes. SOFA reaffirmed the U.S. government’s dominance over 
politics in Japan and U.S. authority in Okinawa.  
 The dominant Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, which was supported by big 
businesses, signed the Security Treaty. The Security Treaty was a contentious political decision, 
but the Liberal Democratic Party argued that by aligning with the United States, Japan could 
achieve industrial prosperity. The ongoing Vietnam War, the Security Treaty, and the possibility 
of Okinawa’s return to Japan ignited reversionists in Japan and Okinawa. Pro-U.S. sympathizers 
dominated Okinawa’s government. HICOM had absolute power of the Chief Executive of the 
Ryukyu Islands. HICOM nominated Chief Executive candidates. The Executive Council of the 
Government of the Ryukyu Islands voted on the candidate they wanted as Chief Executive. The 
Chief Executive candidates and the Executive Council were always Liberal Democratic Party 
members closely tied with their Japanese counterparts.  
 Similar to the “island –wide” movement in 1956, “Reversion” was supported by 
numerous organizations. The first organizations to push for the “reversion” were the Okinawa 
Teachers Association, Zengunro, labor unions, and political parties like the Liberal Party, Liberal 
Democratic Party, and Okinawa People’s Party. Teachers and political organizations wanted to 
raise the standard of living, a demand that had been ignored by the U.S. military government. 
Education was a low priority for USCAR. USCAR often ignored the Okinawa Teachers 
Association requests for funding. Basic rights for labor unions were ignored by the U.S. military 
and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was reluctant to help. The Government of the 
Ryukyu Islands was essential for Okinawa’s reversion, albeit its Chief Executive was selected by 
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HICOM. Okinawa government’s legislation was not always in the best interest of Okinawan 
movement organizations, with Okinawa officials’ bias for the U.S. military. For this reason, 
reversion organizations and supported the Council for Reversion.  
 In 1964, two thousand protestors stormed the Government of the Ryukyu Island’s 
legislature building to protest against the nomination of a new Chief Executive (Tanji 2007). 
They demanded for open Okinawa government elections to the public. Although Liberal Party 
and Liberal Democratic Party members were evacuated from the legislature building, HICOM’s 
nominee was elected as the new Government of the Ryukyu Islands Chief Executive. The 
protestors’ demands were not met. Consequently, the Council for Reversion held mass rallies for 
governmental autonomy and open elections in which approximately fifty thousand people 
participated. Although politically contentious and large in numbers, the Council for Reversion 
and its mass rallies would not win their demands for open elections for another four years.  
The Vietnam War created fears of war reaching Japan and Okinawa by Japanese and 
Okinawan residents. Okinawans and Japanese feared that their links with the US. Military in 
Vietnam made them a target for China. U.S. military representatives announced that B-52 planes 
flew directly from Okinawa to bomb strategic North Liberation Front strongholds in Vietnam. 
An “Absolute Pacifism” sentiment grew in Okinawa with perceived similarities between the 
Vietnam War and the Battle of Okinawa (Tanji 2006). The “absolute pacifists” were at ends with 
the pro-U.S. Liberal Party and Liberal Democratic Party. Okinawa’s two leading political parties 
sought to keep the U.S. military presence with Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. Meanwhile, 
absolute pacifists wanted to return to Japan without the U.S. military in Okinawa. Absolute 
pacifists were publicly critical of using Okinawan civilian military employees in Vietnam. 
Sympathizers for pacifism in Japan and Okinawa feared their livelihoods were threatened by 
58 
Japan and the United States’ roles during the Vietnam War. Japanese Leftists saw the Security 
Treaty as a symbol of Japan’s subservience to Washington. Japan’s Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato 
(in office 1964-1972), face major criticisms for his decisions on the Vietnam War, Okinawa’s 
Reversion, and the renewal of the Security Treaty in 1970. These were three major political 
issues in Japan directly related with the United States. In 1965, Sato visited Okinawa to 
encourage the Government of the Ryukyu Islands’ Liberal Democratic Party’s movement for 
reversion.  But the Council for Reversion mobilized 150,000 demonstrators to rally against 
Sato’s support of the Vietnam War. In another demonstration during Sato’s visit, Council lost 
control of twenty-thousand demonstrators on the main street in Naha. Although police broke up 
the demonstration because it completely disrupted traffic, the Council saw the demonstration as a 
success (Tanji 2006). 
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Chapter 4 - Okinawa 
    Okinawa’s return to Japan shook the political and economic communities. Okinawa was 
restructured to accommodate Japan’s infrastructure and politics. Buildings used by HICOM were 
vacated. Roads were restricted so that drivers drove on the left side as they did in Japan, instead 
of on the right, as they did under U.S. rule. Okinawan military workers laid-off. Shortly after, 
they were rehired as Government of Japan employees to work on the U.S. bases. Politically, 
Okinawa sent representative to the Diet and elected Yara Chobyo as Okinawa’s first governor. 
The U.S. bases in Okinawa now fell under SOFA’s jurisdiction. They shared the same rights and 
limitations as U.S. military bases on mainland Japan. Although the U.S. military closed some 
facilities after the reversion, U.S. military retained a formidable presence on Okinawa. Air 
Stations like Futenma and Kadena are in large residential areas, which still put residents in 
potential danger of military accidents and crimes. The U.S. military and leaders in Tokyo 
disregarded Okinawans’ rights as Japanese citizens, because the SOFA protected U.S. soldiers 
from prosecution in Japanese courts. Okinawa makes up only 0.6 percent of Japan’s total 
landmass, but it sponsors 74 percent of all U.S. military installations in Japan, and occupies 
approximately one fifth of Okinawa’s landmass (Tanji 2007).  
 The Hawaii of Japan 
    Before reversion took full effect, HIMCOM and Tokyo slowly built Okinawa’s infrastructure. 
Japan gave large subsidies to Okinawa to raise its standard of living. Government subsidies in 
the form of public works became Okinawa’s major industry. The construction industry benefited 
government subsidies more than any other industry. By the mid-1990s, revenues made up only 5 
percent of Okinawa’s economy (Allen 2002). Service became the second most profitable 
industry for Okinawa. Many Okinawan cities and towns had mature or fundamental service 
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industry functions and infrastructures. Japan laid the foundations for different forms of tourism 
during the 1960s. Because Japanese officials saw tourism as the most viable means to end 
Okinawa’s poverty. Japan invested heavily in Okinawa’s tourism industry after the reversion, 
especially during the 1980s and early 1990s. Tropical reforestation and landscaping and 
promoting Okinawa’s distinct culture were high priorities for the government. There were major 
changes to the tourism industry as a result of Okinawa’s reversion. First, mainland shoppers no 
longer benefited from low taxes on luxury items, as they did before reversion. Second, mainland 
resort companies bought the nicest beach properties and erected lucrative resorts for prospering 
Japanese businessmen and families. Japan wanted Okinawa to be a culturally distinct island to 
promote the tourist industry and create a stable source of revenue. For Japanese government 
officials, reconstructing Shuri Castle at its original place in Naha was a major initiative (Figal 
2008). Officials relocated the University of the Ryukyus’ in 1984 for the Shuri Castle 
construction. The new Shuri Castle finally opened in 1992, and soon became a prominent symbol 
of Okinawa’s heritage and culture. Ryukyuan music spread throughout Japan when Okinawan 
rock bands mixed traditional Rykyuan folk music with rock music. A Japanese soap opera set 
during the Ryukyu Kingdom was created by marketing and tourism agencies. The show was 
supported by national and local governments because it promoted Okinawa’s new tourism 
identity. Officials in Japan and Okinawa spearheaded an exotic reimaging of Okinawa’s heritage 
to Japan. Local businesses recognized marketable culturally Okinawan products such as 
ceramics, clothing, food and drink, and glassware, which became popular throughout Tokyo 
(Stinchecum 1984). Japanese tourists saw Okinawa as an exotic getaway within the comforts of 
Japan’s own boarders. With Okinawa’s unique heritage, tourism became a viable industry to 
supplement government subsidies and U.S. military rental payments.  
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Industry officials promoted tourism as a major part of Okinawa’s heritage tourism. Many 
Okinawans felt betrayed by the Japanese Emperor, not only because of the way that the Imperial  
Army treated Okinawans during the war, but because the Emperor disregarded Okinawa during 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Ota 1989). Officials in Tokyo wanted to focus solely on 
rebuilding Shuri Castle. But Okinawans felt that remembering their wartime experiences and 
thereafter with a memorial was important to their heritage too (JICA: OIC 2006). Masahide Ota 
and his administration built the Cornerstone of Peace and Peace Museum as a means to teach 
peace through the experiences of the Okinawans. Okinawans taught peace to their children with 
their wartime and U.S. colonization experiences. The Cornerstone of Peace, the Peace Museum, 
and Himeyuri Memorial taught young Okinawans and visitors about Okinawa’s wartime 
experiences (JICA: OIC 2006). The memorials were important, because Japanese officials 
refused to acknowledge their role in the forced labor and coerced suicides, and murders of 
Okinawans during the Battle of Okinawa (Norimitsu Onishi 2007). The Ministry of Education’s 
order to delete the Imperial Army’s actions from Japanese textbooks offended many survivors of 
the war in Okinawa.  
 One-Tsubo Landowners 
    The one-tsubo protesters were the remnants of the 1950s landowner protest movement. The 
one-tsubo community continued a quiet resistance against the U.S. occupation after the original 
movement during the 1950s. Although these landowners never agreed to contracts permitting the 
United States to occupy their land, the U.S. continued their occupation by renegotiating policies 
to disregard the landowners’ rights to their property. The one-tsubo landowners made a small 
portion of the landowners with U.S. occupied land, which consisted of 2.6 percent of Okinawa’s 
population (Yoko Fukumura 2007). But the small portion of non-contracted landowners posed 
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domestic and international legal problems regarding the United States’ legitimacy to occupy 
civilian land. According to international law, Okinawa was not an occupied territory of war after 
its reversion to Japan. The United States was not allowed to forcefully occupy civilian land. 
Therefore, the Government of Japan was obligated to protect the property rights of Japanese 
citizens. Contrarily, officials in Tokyo coerced one-tsubo landowners sign contracts by raising 
the rent of land occupied the United States. The Diet of Japans legalized the use of non-
contracted private property used by the U.S. military for five years after 1972. In 1977, the Diet 
of Japan passed the Land Registration Identification Law. The new law effectively extended the 
Public Property Law.  
    After Okinawa was returned to Japan, protest movements in Okinawa declined. The one-tsubo 
landowners proved to still be defiant, but they did not state island-wide protests as they had in 
the 1950s. The landowners relied on mainstream political groups like the Iken Kyoto in Tokyo 
because the one-tsubo landowners had so few members and very little support in the Diet. One-
tsubo landowners claimed the United States and the government of Japan violated their rights as 
Japanese landowners. The Public Property Law was due to expire and the Diet of Japan was 
about to pass the Land Registration Identification Law to extend the legal presence of the U.S. 
military in Okinawa. But Representative Uehara Kosuke of Okinawa, a one-tsube landowner and 
former Zengunro executive, prolonged the Diet’s vote. Since the Public Property Law expired, 
the United States was obligated to allow the landowners access to their land. Non-contracted 
landowners like Uehara Kosuke entered U.S. military bases to plant seeds or let their chickens 
loose as a sign of protest. The Iken Kyoto filed lawsuits against the United States because the 
United States breached Japanese citizens’ right to own private property. The landowners’ act of 
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defiance was an important symbol for Okinawan politics in the 1990s. It symbolized the ability 
of a small group defying the Government of Japan and the United States.  
    After Okinawa was returned to Japan, groups like the Council for Reversion were disbanded. 
The disbanded in 1977, though former Council members established Iken Kyoto shortly after. 
Iken Kyoto focused on supporting one-tsubo landowners. Other pre-reversion groups integrated 
with their Japanese equivalent organizations. The Okinawa Teachers Association joined the 
Japan’s Teachers Union. Zengunro (the military base workers union) joined its Japanese 
equivalent, Zenchuro. Political parties merged with their Japanese counterparts: OPP merged 
with the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). Okinawa’s Socialist Mass Party (OSMP) was the only 
organization that kept its original structure intact.  
    Okinawa governors were predominately progressive until the late 1990s. Even when a 
governor ran on a nonparty platform, they were usually supported by leftist organizations and 
parties. Although progressive, Okinawan politicians made compromising decisions. Governors 
and mayors permitted military base relocation plans and renewed lease agreements with the 
United States and Japanese government. Governor Ota Masahide, elected 1990, was supported 
by anti-base parties and worker unions. Ota’s administration had a strong anti-military policy. 
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Ota argued that a “realignment and reduction” of U.S. military 
bases on Okinawa was needed. 
 The Rape Incident and Ota’s Response 
    The 1995 rape of a school girl put Okinawa back in the international spotlight. Three U.S. 
servicemen from Camp Hansen kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl, but 
then were kept away from local police and prosecution. U.S. military police invoked Status of 
Forces Agreement, article 17, which safeguarded the three criminals. Only after a furor of 
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domestic and international politics were the three soldiers finally handed over to local 
authorities. In response to the rape, Governor Ota announced he would not authorize the lease 
contracts that legalized the use of non-contracted landowners by the United States.  
    The demonstrations against the U.S. military were not a spontaneous outcry. The landowners 
against the U.S. Military planned an anti-U.S. Military event months in advance. The rape 
incident was a catalyst for protesters from different groups. As Inoue (2004) explained, the one-
tsubo landowners brought attention to the incident; it was not the only group to mobilize protests 
against the U.S. bases. Groups included environmental conservationists, human rights 
organizations, and women’s rights (Inoue 2004). The rape incident bought issues of SOFA back 
to light. Although the rape took place on Sept. 4 1995, the suspects were not handed over to the 
Japanese until Sept. 29 1995 (New York Times 1995). The focus shifted from the rape itself and 
towards SOFA. The larger protests focused on SOFA’s arrangement to deal with crimes 
committed by U.S. personnel in Japan and the fact that the U.S. occupied 19 percent of 
Okinawa’s main island (CNN 1996). Okinawa’s reaction led Prime Minister Hashimoto to 
announce that he and President Clinton that they worked to “…reduce the burden on the 
Okinawan people” (CNN 1996). It would be the start of a long line of promises to relieve 
Okinawa’s burden.  
The protest movement declined as several conditions were met, but not necessarily 
expressed by the protestors as a whole. The eventual release of rape perpetrators from the United 
States military to Japanese law enforcement allowed Okinawans to charge and convict the 
service men under Japanese law, opposed to sending the US personnel back to the Continental 
United States without being tried for any crime - practice by the United States Administration 
before Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  Governor Ota renewed the United States’ lease to occupy 
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land after the Diet of Japan provide Okinawa with a substantial subsidy to host the United States’ 
military. The final piece that derailed the protest movement, in 1996, was when the United States 
and Japan agreed to reduce the amount of land used by the United States military.   
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Chapter 5 - Discussion 
Okinawa’s protest movements have been a part of contentious local, domestic, and 
international politics. Okinawa’s geographical location is an internationally contentious issue by 
itself. Often cited as a necessary military location in East Asia, from the Shogunate to the U.S. 
military, Okinawa’s most valuable resource was its strategic military vantage point. Overall 
issues that overlooked nuanced details like cultural identity and self-reliant economy.  
Analysis 
    Okinawa’s economy relied heavily on the military bases, but also, does not have the means to 
become more self-reliant. Okinawa was not sought after as a prime spot for manufacturing 
companies for Japan. The distance was too far from Okinawa and the wages, although very low 
in the 1950s and comparatively in the 1990s, were not low enough to differentiate the costs for 
greater profit. These decisions seem to prelude Okinawa’s strong tourism economy in the 1990s 
and beyond. Instead, Okinawa’s agriculture industry was the biggest export that didn’t solely 
rely on the military bases. But the military bases took up more than 20% of the arable land, 
which limited Okinawa’s greater export possibilities (Allen 2002). Although the agriculture 
industry did not rely on the military bases, it did rely on the Japanese market. It traded one 
dependency for another. The limitations to Okinawa’s potential export or tourism markets force 
its dependency on either the military bases or the Japanese market. This is also demonstrated in 
the late 1980s and the 1990s with Okinawa’s Free Trade Zone potential. Arguably, Okinawa’s 
geography is favorable as a Free Trade Zone. Okinawa attempted to be more self-reliant with the 
Free Trade Zone. But the attempt failed because it lacked the autonomy from the strong 
centralized Government of Japan. Okinawa had little to no autonomy in regards to international 
decision making, like Hong Kong does as a Free Trade Zone. Thus, Okinawa relies on the 
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subsistence it receives from the Central Government of Japan for hosting the military bases and 
tourism.      
    Throughout each episode, Okinawa relies heavily on larger political and economic factors that 
are out of prefectural control. Whether or not it was intentional, the economy has also been a 
divisive variable for the protest groups. The contentious politics regarding the landowners during 
the 1950s was quashed by paying the majority of the contentious landowners. There were 
contentious landowners that did not agree to the deal, but it effectively kept those contentious 
owners from mobilizing larger groups as they did before. The reversion movement was not 
defined purely by money. The Reversionists wanted fair wages, but also other basic rights that 
their Japanese counterparts received. Once Okinawa returned to Okinawa, the core reversion 
groups received those same rights as their Japanese counterparts, but also became crippled by 
their new limitations. Okinawan unions and teacher association now represented a small 
proportion of their new Japanese organizations. The Okinawa Teacher Association Reversionists 
became a small proportion in the Japanese Teachers Union. The ex-OTA Reversionists also lost 
their ability to protest against the military bases as a teacher since the central Japanese teachers’ 
union forbade representing teachers in such a manner. Whether or not the reversion back to 
Japan satiated the ex-Reversionists’ contentious political behavior, ex-Reversionists could not 
mobilize in the same manner as they once did. The subsequent protests following the 1995 rape 
incident may seem different. The 1995 protests were sparked by a crime against an Okinawan 
citizen. The organization was set by prominent anti-U.S. base groups like the one-tsubo 
landowners, which mobilized other organizations that mobilized other lay-challengers. Most of 
these modern organizations are not tied quite as economically to the bases as previous groups 
were during contentious episodes. Their core repertoires are based around human rights, 
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environmental conservation, or downsizing or removing the bases from Okinawa. But the 
general populace had been split economically as Masamichi Inoue (2007) explained with “We 
Are Okinawan of a Different Kind”.  
 Inoe (2007) explained the importance of citizenship, culture and identity, and local life 
anti-base supporters and pro-base supporters. The fragmentation of the Reversionists was a 
reaction to the U.S.-Japan alliance, as I also note within this thesis. Inoue (2007) further 
demonstrates that the fragmentation is deeper than unions and local economies in relation to 
broader domestic and international policy. It is also the cultural identification of an Okinawan 
within the U.S.-Japan system. The most important economic industry, after financial aid from 
Japan, is Okinawa’s tourism. Okinawa’s tourism celebrates its subtropical and exotic differences 
from Mainland Japan. The tourist industry also shows its experience during the war – a stark 
reminder of their poor treatment by the Mainland Japanese during and after World War II and by 
the U.S. Military. The tourism industry’s plays a dichotomist role of promoting both pro-U.S. 
bases and anti-bases sentiments. Allen’s (2002) research on Kumejima revealed that tourism help 
formulate an anti-base sentiment because of Kumejima’s experience during World War II, 
especially since it was relatively untouched by the U.S. occupation.  
Inoue (2007) explained that it was Governor Ota that created the split in the Okinawan 
identity. It was Ota’s tactic to let Nago and Tokyo deal through the base relocation, which 
demonstrated the class differences between the middle and working classes needs for economic 
development. Tokyo took advantage of this split in identity by offering financial aid if Nago 
accepted the relocation plan. Instead, there has been a split identity since the post-conflict era, 
but it was not prominent until the late-1990s. The split in identity was propagated by the ongoing 
political structure and political economy in Okinawa, amalgamated with Okinawans, HICOM, 
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Washington and Tokyo. Studying the political economy does demonstrate an early difference 
among the Reversionists. Reversionists diversified into different groups with specific agendas, as 
the case of the Okinawa Women Against Military Violence as early as the 1980s. The 1995 rape 
incident and the subsequent years highlighted these different groups more profoundly. 
 The Koza riot was different from any of the protests. The Koza riot symbolized an 
underrepresented part of occupied Okinawan society. Okinawa was changing with a strong sense 
of Japanese nationalism. Taxi drivers were the first at the scene of the first accident that begun 
the sequence of commotion leading to a riot. The riot was spontaneous only in the sense that the 
accident was not planned. Taxi drivers were and still are a target of violence committed by U.S. 
personnel. The riot revolved around the entertainment district where prostitutes, bar owners, and 
taxi drivers worked. Many Okinawans worked for the bases, directly and indirectly, but these 
groups in the entertainment districts were subjected to petty and violent crimes. They were not 
treated lawfully equal by the U.S. military regime nor were they being represented equally by the 
Japanese nationalist movement in Okinawa. As a sign of identification strife, the riot depicted a 
small group that was not Japanese or American. They, as Okinawans, were culturally reduced 
and presented as an inferior colonial group without the rights of Japanese or Americans. What 
were these “riot Okinawans” fighting for? Surely there were many Reversionists among the 
rioters, but a violent riot was uncharacteristic of Okinawans and the reversionist movement to 
that point. Not only was the riot a response to political uncertainty as Aldous (2003) argues, it 
was also the rift in the idea of being Japanese or Okinawan. Part of the political uncertainty was 
Tokyo’s draft reversion agreements favored Washington over Okinawa. Okinawans, even as a 
whole, were seemingly underrepresented and the entertainment workers were further 
underrepresented by all major parties in the reversion “era.” 
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 Theory and Okinawa 
 There are distinct ebb and flows between the 1950s, the reversion movement, and the 
1990s movements. Authorities bought off or forced Okinawan landowners to sell their land 
during the 1950 social movements. It effective cut off important support to the core groups of the 
landowner movement. The rape of a girl in the 1950s sparked contentious politics that allowed 
the landowners to mobilize landowners, anti-war advocates, and many others for a mass protest. 
The landowners were able to use the girl as a symbol that brought additional support to their 
cause against the U.S. occupation. Tarrow (1998) explained that contention can reveal the 
weakness of authorities, effectively creating opportunities to move more people to join in 
contentious action. This is an example of Tarrow’s explanation of using political opportunities 
for contentious politics. An opportunity is only contentious if it is used for contentious action. 
The landowner movement lost contentious political actors when many of the landowners made 
deals to rent their land to the USCAR. It was an effective solution by USCAR. It also solved 
contentious issues regarding illegal seizures of land by an occupying country; a potential 
opportunity for international challengers against the U.S. military. The anti-base landowners had 
less support from similar Okinawans, since their repertoire for collective action became 
relatively moot. Although the larger protest consisted of more than just the landowners, 
additional landowners challenging USCAR allowed other would-be challengers to mobilize as 
well. 
The riot in Koza could be seen as a non-ideological spontaneous riot against the U.S. 
Military. Hobsbawm (1959) argued that riots were movements which were not inspired by 
specific ideologies. This thesis revealed that even this seemingly spontaneous movement was 
71 
disconnected from the reversionist movement; it was more organized and had a distinct 
ideological purpose.  
Enloe (1989) explained, women are often treated as symbols to nationalist movements. 
The rapes had been used to symbolically mobilize would-be challengers to the contentious 
political realm, even if those would-be challengers are not invested in the repertoire of the core 
protest groups. Okinawa was not different from what Enloe argued. Although the role of women 
in Okinawa protests had progressed since the 1950s, if often used women as symbols. Women 
organizations took more active and international roles. Even with the progress, women were 
often used symbolically as a point of political contention as a means to for social mobilization. 
The rape and death of an Okinawan girl in the 1950s was a source of en masse symbolism. The 
rape of a girl in the 1990s and subsequent protests were similar to that of the 1955 incident. The 
initial protest gathering was planned by the one-tsubo landowners well before the rape incident. 
But the landowners used the rape of the girl as a symbol against the U.S. occupation.  Central 
symbols for the 1950s and 1990s large protests were the girls that were raped by U.S. military 
personnel. Rape is not just committed by U.S. personnel, but by Okinawans too. Although the 
1995 rape victim did not want to speak in public, there was an 18 year old school girl that read 
her statement in her place.  
  Considerations 
The “Okinawan Struggle” as a singular movement or group since the 1950s may be a 
myth, but it is still an important mobilizer for would-challengers. Crime among Okinawans is 
greater than the crime towards Okinawans by U.S. personnel. This fact does not deter Okinawans 
from unifying on a larger scale to protest against the U.S. military. The cultural identity is 
fragmented, there is seemingly less unity as there was in the past, but there are certain things that 
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can still mobilize the larger population. The various organizations in Okinawa are well organized 
and understand how to mobilize their perspective supporters efficiently. They continue to 
effectively use contentious opportunities to stage large protests against the U.S. bases. Heinous 
crimes against young women are a common opportunity to mobilize would-be challengers. Even 
after the 1995 rape incident, other major protests revolved around assaults against women. The 
incidents included: U.S. Marine Corp Major Michael Brown’s attempt to assault and rape a 
bartender in 2003 (Allen 2005); the rape and murder of a 20-year-old Okinawan woman, 
allegedly by a Marine Corps employed civilian base worker in 2016 (Miller 2016). But it also 
shows that large Okinawa can mobilize large amounts of anti-base supporters without using 
crime against women as a symbol too. In 2015, Okinawan organizations organized 
approximately 35,000 demonstrators to rally against the relocation of the Futenma Air Base; 
arguing it should be removed from Okinawa (Japan Times Online 2015).  
 The problems in Okinawa with the U.S.-Japan alliance are complicated. It is rooted in 
Okinawa’s history with Japan, the U.S. military, and SOFA. The repertoire focuses on the 
complete removal of bases from Okinawa, not just the relocation of a base to another part of 
Okinawa. There is a small but slowly growing Okinawan separatist movement as well. The 
separatists claim that they need to separate from the Central Government of Japan in order to 
remove the U.S. bases. This group has yet to gain more traction or support than the overall anti-
base supporters. It seems unlikely the separatists ever would, since their repertoire excludes 
much of the fragmented populace, especially the moderate pro-base supporters that may support 
a more general cause like amending the SOFA to protect Okinawan citizens.  
 Okinawa’s protest history reinforces Cynthia Enloe (1989) and Hein’s (1999) theories 
that women are often used as symbols within the nationalist movements. Rape of a girl in 1950s 
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and the rape of the girl in 1995 were major catalysts for “Okinawan” protests. Other groups such 
as women’s rights, human rights, and environmental conservationists shifted their attention to 
other larger issues, opposed to using the 1995 rape victim as a poster child to mobilize potential 
protesters. Japan used tourism, not as a way to help Okinawa, but to exploit Okinawa’s 
impoverishment in the 1960s and continued to use Okinawa into the 1990s. As Enloe (1989) 
pointed out, tourism often leads to a dependency on “foreign” money, instead of self-reliance on 
domestic industry.  
 This thesis is limited by relying on other researchers’ research and translations of 
Japanese source material. It does not have the strength to conclude on attitudes and in-depth 
micro or quantitative research of Okinawans. The thesis benefits from a new perspective and a 
world-system’s point of view. The thesis acts as a retest to Miyume Tanji and Masamichi Inoue’s 
research; concluding that the “Okinawan Struggle” is much more dynamic the “struggle” is not a 
linear protest movement stated often by U.S. media sources. Although Okinawans had protested 
against the U.S. bases since the 1950s, those protest actors and organizations changed since the 
1950s. Researching Okinawa’s protests movement should focus more on the most recent politics 
concerning the U.S. bases. Research from here on out could see if the U.S. and Japan have kept 
to the statement of relieving Okinawa of their burden.  
The political and world system had important roles in the ebb and flow of Okinawa’s 
protest movements. Tanji (2006) and Inoue (2004) both explain that the “Okinawa Struggle” is 
dynamic and adjusted within each cycle of contention in order to mobilize and take advantage of 
political opportunities. This thesis also shows how external forces seemingly affected the 
“Okinawan Struggle” identity. It demonstrates how external forces affected the political ability 
to act on political opportunities when opportunities were available. Studying each episode of 
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contention separately we see different levels and types of governments. Each government also 
set the political environment in which contentious actors could act. This is even the case during 
the Okinawa’s periods of annexation and assimilation. Arguably, Okinawans could not 
effectively act on contentious opportunities since the political environment was hostile; 
especially during war. But Okinawan’s did resist against Japan’s pre-WWII assimilation 
attempts. During the 1950s, external forces like the United States Civil Administration, created 
the political environment were at its strictest during the United States’ Administration period.  
The reversion had the largest impact on Okinawan actors’ ability to organize protests. Japan’s 
investment in Okinawa, by providing subsidies, to host to the United States military forced 
Okinawa to rely on Japan economically. Okinawa also relied on Japan’s tourism. Since tourism 
was recreated as a means to draws Japanese consumers, it created a polarizing cultural effect on 
the protest movements. The reversion also effectively assimilated prominent protest 
organizations from the 1970s into Japanese organizations. Since the reversion, Okinawa lacked 
actors that could effectively use political opportunities to mobilize the wider population to 
protest against the United States military.  
 There have been massive anti-base protests since the decline of the 1995 protests. 
Approximately 100,000 people protested against a new base in 2010 (Al Jazeera 2016). The new 
base was part of a way to relocate United States personnel from densely populated areas in 
Okinawa. Anti-base supporters protested against the United States military in the summer of 
2016 after the rape of a local woman in April of 2016 (Al Jazeera 2016). The 2016 protests are 
seemingly similar, but I cannot determine who the major actors have been. It is unclear from my 
perspective to say if the same actors that took mobilized 100,000 people in 2010 are the same 
actors mobilizing Okinawans in 2016. Okinawa is currently in the flow of contention, but it is 
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unclear if the recent protests are a part of the 1995 protests. Isolating and researching the current 
protests and their actors would be important to understand what would create an ebb or allow for 
it to flow.  
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Appendix A - Acronyms and Meanings 
HICOM Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands  
GRI Government of the Ryukyu Islands 
OTA Okinawa Teachers Association 
USCA United States Civil Administration 
SCAP Supreme Commander of Allied Powers 
RYCOM Ryukyu Command 
USCAR United States Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyus 
 
